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Understanding the support from the Australian far-left and ALP-Left for Greek Cypriot enosis during the EOKA period (1955-59): migrant workers, anti-imperialism and national liberation in Australia

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ABSTRACT

Why did the Australian far-left, namely the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), and the left-wing of the Australian Labor Party (ALP-left), support Cypriot enosis (union with Greece), when it was led by a violent far-right nationalist group, EOKA, and Greece was a repressive right-wing state? There are two aspects to answering this question: the ideological-intellectual and the political-electoral. Intellectually, the CPA and the ALP-left favoured their anti-imperialism and support for left-wing national liberation over any qualms in supporting far-right nationalist causes. Politically, they saw an electoral opportunity in courting left-wing and potential left-wing Greek-speaking migrants from Greece and Cyprus and championing both their labour and perceived 'national' causes. In doing so, they engaged with the Greek-speaking migrant labouring classes and gave prominence to their perceived 'national' struggles. This article considers why and how the Australian far-left in the form of the CPA and ALP-left became involved in the enosis politics of Greek Cypriots and the violent struggle of a small far-right minority in the island, while attempting to court the votes of left-wing Greek-speaking migrants, by supporting them in what they accepted was their 'national' cause – the 'liberation' of Cyprus and its enosis with Greece.

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In 1957 Don Dunstan, a future Australian Labor Party (ALP) premier of South Australia (1967–68 & 1970–79), visited Cyprus, Greece and the UK on a fact-finding mission for the Committee for Cypriot Self-determination (CCSD) in connection with the far-right 'National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters' (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγγωνιστών/EOKA) uprising demanding *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) against British rule. Dunstan, only 30 then, having entered the SA parliament in 1953, made an impression in Nicosia, Athens and London for his strong advocacy in support for self-determination for Cyprus, which he and others used euphemistically to mean *enosis*, and condemnation of the British security forces in response to the nationalist uprising. Although as a legal mind Dunstan had a professional interest, why was he and other ALP members, namely Clive (NSW ALP MP) and Doc Evatt (federal ALP and opposition leader), and Gough Whitlam, a rising federal ALP MP and future Prime Minister, interested in the crisis engulfing this small British colony in the eastern Mediterranean? Dunstan was also accompanied by Dr Kenneth Buckley, a lecturer in economic history at the University of Sydney, a noted communist and former member of the CPA. Although

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Buckley had a personal interest in the Cypriot case, being married to a Greek, he was not the only communist involved, so why had the CPA played such a prominent role in supporting Cypriot *enosis* and EOKA? Seemingly the Cyprus emergency had brought together the more radical left-wing forces in Australia because of their shared anti-imperialism and support for national liberation, whether violent or not, whether left-wing or right-wing, hoping to capture this migrant vote.

Historiographies and framework

This article contributes to several historiographies across Australian, Cypriot, imperial and colonial, and migration histories. The histories of Australia and Cyprus have rarely been studied together. Although in recent years there has been some work on Cypriot migration and settlement in Australia (Varnava & Smith, 2019, pp. 277–312; Varnava, 2020, pp. 95–122, 2022a, pp. 132–76), more is needed, including on Cypriot national issues in Australian politics.

Cypriot enosis, anti-imperialism and nationalism: understanding the Cypriot context

The main contribution of this article is to Australian history and historiography, yet it is important to start with Cypriot history and historiography in order to understand Cypriot *enosis*, nationalism and anti-imperialism across the radical right- and left-wing forces in the island in order to then understand the responses of the radical left in Australia. Cypriot history and historiography are dominated by nationalist and anti-imperial views and approaches, whether written by Cypriots or not (Varnava, 2017, pp. 291–303, 2018, pp. 243–57, 2021). These works have claimed that the EOKA uprising, starting in April 1955, was the natural outcome of years of British imperialism and demands by the Greek Cypriot demographic majority, numbering roughly 78% of the population, for *enosis*. Thus, the violence by EOKA, although not supported by the left, that is AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People/Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού), was nonetheless not opposed by it because it too supported *enosis*. It thus becomes justified amongst a broad coalition of supporters throughout the world and since within the historiography as anti-imperial, anti-colonial and pro-liberation nationalism, although it was specifically far-right and excluded AKEL. In fact, EOKA understood the importance of propaganda not only in the island but particularly abroad, and used Greek and Greek Cypriot supporters in the UK, the US and in Australia, along with local, usually left-wing politicians, to galvanise international support regardless of what ideology lay behind such support. About the latter, some research has been published on the UK and Irish contexts (Carruthers, 1995; Hadjiathanasiou, 2020; O'Shea, 2015; Varnava & Raeside, 2019, pp. 277–301), but much more is needed on other examples. This article contributes to the little that has been published on the Australian response (Shialis, 2015, pp. 125–39).

In more recent years new research has applied a critical lens to those events between 1955 and 1959, as well as to their origin and aftermath. Particularly noteworthy is the work of David French (2015) on the period 1955–1959 and that by Andrekos Varnava (2021) on the origins of EOKA. EOKA did not magically appear in 1955 or indeed in 1951, with some of the men involved in its formation in 1951 being involved in an earlier clandestine far-right group formed in 1929 that was prepared to use violence, especially against any perceived 'traitors', which EOKA did with ruthlessness. EOKA itself was anti-communist and far-right nationalist, despite trying to project the idea that it represented what it claimed was the natural and universal Greek Cypriot desire for *enosis*. In fact, EOKA was not anti-imperial, although it used anti-imperial propaganda language, it was merely against British colonialism because it prevented *enosis*, and it had nothing wrong with British imperialism or colonialism elsewhere, or about the expansion of Greek imperialism in Cyprus. The anti-communism of EOKA was fundamental to its nature, since several historians have now established that it was formed from a fear that AKEL would take the lead in the 'national liberation struggle'. Excluding the left was but one form of exclusion. The other was the Turkish Cypriot community, which numbered 20% and was demographically a minority, but since *enosis* supporters wanted to unite with Greece, it

would be only logical that Turkish Cypriots would want to unite with Turkey, and so in this larger demographic context, Turks outnumbered the Greeks. This fact was ignored by EOKA and AKEL. But this was not the only thing they had in common. Their support of *enosis*, although open, was also masked behind a particular justification that was better understood internationally, and that is the maxim of self-determination. International supporters also used the term 'self-determination' to sometimes both prosecute *enosis* openly or to hide their support of *enosis* behind it. The same is true of the Australian CCSD, which will be studied closely below.

The politics of multiculturalism

The CCSD was an early example of Australian political parties playing politics with multiculturalism, well before multiculturalism became an official policy in many Western states, including Australia, in the 1970s. Perhaps it is only natural that once migrant groups become voters, the interest in their votes develops from political parties. In recent decades in Australia, both mainstream parties, the ALP and the Liberal Party, have courted migrant voters, especially of large communities such as the Greek and Chinese. While traditionally most Greeks voted for the ALP, in the mid-1990s the Liberal premier of Victoria, Jeff Kennett, backed the Greeks over the naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (now North Macedonia), and was referred to as 'Kennettopoulos' by the North Macedonian community (Danforth, 1997, p. 172). More recently the ALP has tried to reassert itself over Greek Australian voting patterns by supporting the recognition of a 'Greek Genocide' in Anatolia during and after the Great War (Diamadis, 2017, pp. 91–152; Kritikakos, 2021), although what befell Anatolian Greeks would be more accurately called ethnic cleansing (Sjöberg, 2017; Varnava, 2016, pp. 121–3).¹

This article attempts to historicise the politics of multiculturalism in Australia well before it became a widespread term or an official policy. The case is unusual, since it may appear that the Cypriots were not large enough on their own to warrant such attention for their votes. Yet Greek Cypriots were claimed by Greeks and Greece, despite being British, and many Greek Cypriots claimed to be Greek and to desire *enosis*, so they were readily included by the CPA and ALP into the larger and more populous Greek community. But this only mattered if Greeks were naturalised, because only naturalised migrants, unless they were British subjects, could vote. So it is important that Cypriots could vote as soon as they stepped foot in Australia by virtue of being British. It was vital for the CPA and ALP, both of whom were struggling to win voters from the 1949 election, to fight for every migrant vote. In the 1950s and 1960s the ALP struggled with its identity more broadly and its approach to the migrant vote, which was reflected in its electoral fortunes. The Liberals attacked it for being soft on communism and the ALP right faction was less interested in the migrant votes than its left faction. Nevertheless, it polled over 50% of the vote in the 1954 federal election, which must have been in small part to migrant votes, but it dipped substantially in the 1955 election and did not recover in the 1958 vote, although it did in 1961, winning the two-party preferred vote. The changing percentage of votes for the CPA from 1946 to 1958 shows an increase from the 1949 election (0.9%) to 1954 (1.25%), holding in the 1955 election (1.16%), only to fall slightly in 1958 (0.53%) probably as a result of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Politically, both the CPA and the left faction in the ALP saw an electoral opportunity in courting the significant numbers of left-wing and potential left-wing Greek-speaking migrants from Greece and Cyprus and championing both their labour and perceived 'national' causes. But their success in winning the migrant vote was clearly varied.

The CPA and the ALP on anti-imperialism and pro-liberation nationalism

With Greek Cypriot *enosis* and the violent outbreak by EOKA, the CPA and ALP-left followed their colleagues in the UK, namely in the Communist Party of Great Britain CPGB and the left-faction within the British Labour Party, in supporting 'self-determination', which they clarified as meaning *enosis*. In the same way that British and Australian border controls and monitoring of 'undesirable' migrants were interconnected, the political elites of both

countries practised (and continue to practise) the politics of multiculturalism to win votes (Varnava, 2022a; Smith, 2022; Smith, Varnava & Marmo, 2021, pp. 1354–74). For the CPA this was an attempt to follow the successful efforts of the CPGB in courting Commonwealth migrants (Barnett & Smith, 2017, pp. 51–76; Smith, 2016, pp. 283–315). This included Cypriots. In the UK, where the Cypriots lived in much larger numbers than in Australia, Cypriots were prominent in the CPGB (Smith & Varnava, 2017, pp. 1149–81; Varnava, 2022a). The CPGB followed the position of AKEL (Smith & Varnava, 2017; Varnava & Smith, 2019; Varnava, 2020, 2021, 2022a). Initially AKEL supported *enosis* following a period of self-government under British rule, but soon after Ezekias Papaioannou, who had lived in London for over a decade, became leader it adopted an immediate *enosis* policy without a period of self-government (Chehab, 1949a, 1949b). As for the ALP, those on the left followed the left-wing of the British Labour Party, in being more outspoken on self-determination/*enosis* and criticising the Cypriot government for repression against EOKA and AKEL, and the general population (Varnava, 2022a). Those on the right in both parties were less outspoken, particularly publicly.

The CPA and the ALP-left were ideologically anti-imperialist and pro-nationalist liberation. For them it was therefore natural to oppose the continuation of British rule in Cyprus and the actions of the Cypriot colonial government in trying to suppress the EOKA uprising. However, the vast majority of pro-nationalist liberation movements were left-wing nationalist. EOKA was far-right wing. This does not appear to have impacted the decisions of the CPA and ALP-left to support *enosis*, thus their support for anti-imperialism and national liberation superseded any qualms they may have had in supporting far-right nationalist causes.

Methodology

The article is driven by an analysis of the official records from multiple archives and documents from various departments, including personal ASIO files, to obtain multiple perspectives and as complete a picture as possible. The picture is obscured by the Australian authorities retaining and redacting sensitive documents, yet an overall picture emerges of the involvement of the CPA and ALP-left in pro-*enosis* activities in Australia. The archival record is supplemented with significant use of the Australian newspapers.

Whereas most work on Australian migration history approaches the reconstruction of the historical record from an Australian perspective, this article also approaches this from the perspective of the migrant's 'old' country. For example, in this case it might be stated by an Australian-focused approach that EOKA was indeed national liberation, but someone approaching this from a Cypriot-history perspective would argue that EOKA did not aim to achieve Cypriot independence, it never intended to be inclusive of all Cypriots, particularly left-wing and Turkish Cypriots, but aimed at union with another country, Greece, contrary to the wishes of the sizeable Turkish Cypriot demographic minority and to the detriment of a substantial left-wing body, since Greece was notorious for persecuting left-wing politicians and supporters in general. This offers an equal focus to approaching migration history from a deep knowledge of the country of origin of the migrant, rather than taking at face value the views of supporters and lobbyists on a particular line of advocacy and agitation.

The structure is broadly chronological, after a brief analysis of statistics to show the fluctuating settlement patterns of Cypriots to Australia. What then follows is a logical separation between the early CPA-dominated efforts at supporting *enosis* and then the ALP-left efforts, until the Zurich-London Accords in February 1959 ended the crisis, at least temporarily, and led to the formation of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cypriot migration to Australia

Cypriots arrived in large numbers to Australia from 1947 to 1952. Cypriots had arrived during the inter-war years, but in low numbers owing to restrictions, despite their status as British subjects (Varnava & Smith, 2019; Varnava, 2022a). Between the censuses of 1947 and 1954 Cypriot-born went from 683 to 5,773, an increase of 158%, representing the second-largest growth rate of any Mediterranean group (Table 1), even above the Maltese who had an assisted passage scheme. But thereafter arrivals fell, more than for most other Mediterranean groups, with the 1961 census recording 8,576 Cypriot-born, an increase of only 39% from 1954. Arrivals and net arrivals (Table 2) peaked in 1951 and 1952, declined in 1953, revived marginally from 1954 to 56, before declining again, while from 1953 more women arrived than men. Men were also leaving Australia at higher rates, peaking in 1952 at 130, with fewer during the ‘troubles’ in Cyprus from 1955 to 58 (Table 3) (Varnava, 2022a).

Table 1. Australian census results by birthplace, 1933–1966: Mediterranean migration.

Country/Colony	1933	1947	1954	1961	1966
Italy No.	26,756	33,632	119,897	228,296	267,325
% increase	N/A	22.8	112.4	62.3	15.8
Greece No.	8,337	12,291	25,862	77,333	140,089
% increase	N/A	38.3	71.1	99.8	57.7
Yugoslavia No.	3,969	5,866	22,856	49,776	71,277
% increase	N/A	38.6	118.3	74.1	35.5
Malta No.	2,782	3,238	19,988	39,337	55,104
% increase	N/A	15.2	144.2	65.2	33.4
Egypt No.	561	803	8,150	16,287	22,041
% increase	N/A	35.5	164.1	66.6	30.0
Spain No.	1,141	992	1,357	3,831	10,914
% increase	N/A	−14.0	31.1	95.4	96.1
Cyprus No.	502	681	5,773	8,576	10,703
% increase	N/A	30.3	157.8	39.1	22.1
Lebanon No.	N/A	N/A	3,861	7,253	10,668
% increase	N/A	N/A	N/A	61.0	38.1
France No.	2,587	2,215	4,699	5,409	6,637
% increase	N/A	−15.5	71.9	14.0	20.4
Israel No.	N/A	1,658	2,669	3,471	3,861
% increase	N/A	N/A	46.7	26.1	10.6
Turkey No.	281	252	1,036	1,544	2,476
% increase	N/A	−10.9	121.7	39.4	46.4
Total	46,916	61,628	216,148	441,113	601,095
% increase	N/A	27.1	111.3	68.5	30.7

Table 2. Cypriot arrivals and net arrivals to Australia, 1947–59 (Brooks Cyprus report).

Year	Arrivals			Net Arrivals		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
1947	N/A	N/A	N/A	122	58	180
1948	N/A	N/A	N/A	432	65	497
1949	N/A	N/A	N/A	738	144	882
1950	N/A	N/A	N/A	509	196	705
1951	1,304	332	1,636	1,276	327	1,603
1952	986	334	1,320	856	320	1,176
1953	45	120	165	−36	113	77
1954	213	309	522	130	296	426
1955	317	613	930	272	604	876
1956	276	467	743	237	460	697
1957	95	170	265	59	158	217
1958	101	210	311	82	201	283
1959	28	89	137	−4	61	57

Table 3. Cypriot departures from Australia (Brooks Cyprus report).

Year	Departures		
	Male	Female	Total
1951	28	15	43
1952	130	14	144
1953	81	7	88
1954	83	13	96
1955	45	9	54
1956	39	7	46
1957	36	12	48
1958	19	9	38
1959	32	28	60

The reason for the reduced number of Cypriots arriving in Australia from 1953 was the restrictions placed upon this group by the Australian authorities. There were various reasons for these restrictions, ranging from the poorer economic circumstances of Cypriot arrivals, their lack of English proficiency, and their growing unemployment in Australia, but the chief reasons were the association of Cypriots in Australia with the CPA and links with AKEL. In mid-1948, the Labor government froze Form 47 applications from Cypriots after almost receiving 1,500 applications in the first five months of 1948 and when it removed the freeze in 1949 it limited processing to 50 applications per month. In August 1951 Holt went further after a handful of Cypriots arrived with criminal records, with only wives, fiancées, parents, children, brothers or unmarried sisters eligible for nomination by relatives in Australia, and those on Form 47 could apply only if a case ‘presented outstanding features’. After the crisis with the *Corsica* in 1952, discussed further below, Holt went further, probably also concerned about the involvement of the Communist Party of Australia in gathering 195 signatures from Cypriots in mid-1952 that complained about unemployment. While he imposed harsher quotas on Mediterranean arrivals through assisted passage agreements, for Cypriots he limited entry to only close relatives and to those with jobs in rural or essential industries (Form 47), limited to 50 per month irrespective of country of origin (thus including Cypriots in Egypt, who had started leaving owing to the military revolution). When processing of applications was suspended between 1956 and 1959, it was because of the activities of EOKA in Cyprus. On the one hand this was a safety issue for Australian personnel travelling to Cyprus to review applications and applicants, and on the other to prevent radical right-wing extremists from making their way to Australia, particularly since the support for *enosis* was led by left-wing radicals in Australia (Varnava, 2022a).

The CPA and Cypriots in Australia until 1955

As the Australian authorities monitored Greek and Italian Communists and Irish Republicans for their involvement and interaction with the CPA, they also monitored Cypriots (Smith, Bright, 2022, pp. 13–58; Smith & Dukova, 2020, pp. 251–70; Smith et al., 2021, pp. 106–31; Smith, 2018, pp. 45–60). Until 1949 the Special Branches of the state police forces and the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department handled security and intelligence. Active members of the CPA were monitored as soon as the party was established (Horner, 2014). In 1949 the Australian government created ASIO to replace the role of the Special Branches. It monitored migrants, including Cypriots, as individuals or as members of Cypriot or Greek organisations, because of their activities in the CPA and for the connections to AKEL.

The monitoring was focused in the Australian capital cities with sizeable Cypriot communities and on Cypriot clubs and Greek clubs with Cypriot members. Though most clubs were created in the 1930s, the monitoring began during World War II when Greek Communist seamen arrived and frequented these clubs, and it was only from 1945 that Cypriots appear as subversive (Director, SA, 1945; Jordan, 2013, p. 72). The largest clubs were the Democritus League at 217 Russell Street,

Melbourne, and the Atlas Club at 252 Pitt Street, Sydney, both left-wing Greek clubs with Cypriots, and associated with Cypriot clubs, including the Cypriot brotherhoods 'Zenon', 68 Victoria St., West Brunswick, Melbourne, and 'Evagoras', 192 Castlereagh St., Sydney (ASIO, 1954b). In 1952 ASIO reported that the Democritus League had been regarded in 1944 'as equivalent to the Greek Branch of the Communist Party' and was 'still reported to be Communist controlled' (Security services, 1952, December). Communist influence of Cypriot clubs began in 1948 when in the elections for the Cypriot Brotherhood in Sydney the newly arrived communists Michael Paraskeva and L. Kouratellarides were elected as secretary and president respectively (Atlas Centre, 1948). Another Cypriot in Sydney, Philippos Yioupous, was monitored because he was a fanatical communist in the Brotherhood and Atlas Club, and had often threatened violence when talking politics (Deputy-Director, Sydney to Director, Canberra, 1949, 7 October).

While the historiography emphasizes that the crisis in July 1952 at Bonegilla precipitated the restrictions on Southern Europeans (Dellios, 2017; Jordan, 2013, pp. 171–5), they had already been decided upon months earlier, especially for Cypriots (Varnava, 2022a). The decision to ease restrictions on Maltese but retain them for Cypriots was largely because Maltese were preferred as a consequence of their role in World War II, their better knowledge of English, and the Australian-Maltese assisted passage agreement, which gave Canberra control on the number of arrivals (Calwell, 1948, 31 May; Heyes, 1953d, 9 April; York, 1990). Cypriot migrants were not favoured because of their perceived unemployability and radical left-wing activism, including their labour unionism, membership of the CPA and links with AKEL. The imprisonment of AKEL leaders in Cyprus in January 1946 for conspiracy against the government contributed towards the monitoring of left-wing Cypriot activists in Australia (Brooks Cyprus report; The West Australian, 1946, 23 January, p. 5; The Canberra Times, 1946a, 14 August, p. 1; 1946b 19 August, p. 1; Varnava, 2022a). In 1951 the Australian authorities became concerned by the relationship between the Democritus League and the Atlas Club with AKEL, which they had been monitoring closely since 1950. Initially the monitoring focused on how they and individuals, such as John Savvas in Darwin and Phoebus Kyriakides in Sydney, received AKEL monthly reports (Redacted, 1950; NAA, A6122/1218, p. 124). Also, it was concerned with individuals nominating AKEL members to migrate, such as when Petros Ioannou nominated Pythagoras Christodoulou, because he might be related to Miltiades Christodoulou, an AKEL official. There was also concern that Miltiades was related to Petros Christodoulou, a member of the Democritus League and Cypriot Brotherhood (General, 1951b, September, redacted). ASIO discovered that Takis Pitsiatakis had contacted Miltiades Christodoulou, from the Central Publications Bureau of AKEL, and Tefkros Anthias, the noted Cypriot communist and literary figure in London, asking for communist books in Greek for the education of the AKEL 'cell' in Melbourne. Pitsiatakis and Petros Christodoulou, a member of AKEL before emigrating, were elected on 14 May 1950 to the executive of the Cypriot Brotherhood (General, 1951a, redacted). In 1951 ASIO became concerned about donations to AKEL from Pitsiatakis and Petros Ioannou from the Democritus League and Atlas Club respectively (Political counterintelligence, 1951, 28 June).

In 1952 a crisis emerged with the arrival of the *Corsica* with over 760 Cypriots (Corsica Passenger Lists, 1952b, 1952c, 1952d, 1952e; Corsica Passenger List, 1952), which played out in the newspapers and parliament. The *Corsica* was nothing like the luxury liner boasted about in advertisements in Cypriot newspapers (*Ελευθερία*, 1951b, 6 November, p. 4; *Ελευθερία*, 1951c, 9 November, p. 4; *Ελευθερία*, 1951a, 13 November, p. 4). The stench for most of the trip from Limassol due to rotting vegetables, mainly potatoes, which saw the ship quarantined and washed twice, the unsanitary conditions after the toilets and showers became blocked, the petrol smell in the tap-water, widespread food poisoning, the tilt of the ship, and the lack of drinking water, amongst other issues, made front page news for days and the porters received additional pay because they became violently ill (The Age, 1952a, 5 February, pp. 1 & 3; The Argus, 1952, 5 February, p. 1; Daily Telegraph, 1952, 5 February, p. 5; Mail, 1952a, 5 February, p. 3; 6 February, p. 1; The Advertiser, 1952b, 6 February, p. 3). It was even discussed in parliament, when the anti-immigration Liberal, William Haworth (MP for Isaacs, Victoria) asked Holt why, in reference to the comments of the Greek

captain, these troublesome elements from Cypriot slums were allowed in. Holt retorted that the government did not control unassisted migrant voyages (House of Representatives, 1952, 6 February; The Age, 1952b, 7 February, p. 6; 5 February, pp. 1 & 3; The Advertiser, 1952a, 7 February, p. 6; 1952b 6 February, p. 3; The Argus, 1952, 5 February, p. 1; Daily Telegraph, 1952, 5 February, p. 5; Mail, 1952a, 5 February, p. 3; 1952b 6 February, p. 1). In any event, this sealed the fate of further Cypriot migration to Australia as the government restricted them further (Varnava, 2022a).

The attention on the *Corsica* was but one concern for the Liberal government, the other was the involvement of Greek and Cypriot communists in the CPA on the unemployment of Cypriots in Victoria, many of whom had arrived on the *Corsica*. This was led by George Zangalis, a well-known Greek activist with the CPA, with lesser-known Cypriot communists, who took a petition signed by 268 unemployed recently arrived Cypriots to the Immigration Department on 24 June demanding, essentially the CPA line, that migration cease until work was available and the government invest in public works to relieve unemployment. The petition, with the signatures and villages of the signatories, was published in the leading Greek-language newspaper in Cyprus to deter others interested in migrating to Australia (Ελευθερία, 1952, 18 July, p. 4). Based on the names on the petition and a check of the roll of those arriving on the *Corsica*, there were at least 54 individuals who had signed and had arrived on the *Corsica* out of a total of 636 Cypriot men from that ship (Corsica Passenger List, 1952b, 1952c, 1952d, 1952e, 1952a, 25 January). Zangalis and the CPA had managed to tap into the dissatisfaction within those unemployed from amongst the Cypriot community in Victoria. He claimed that 150, mainly Cypriots, had left Australia on the *Cyrenia* on 24 June because of unemployment. But the Immigration Department questioned Zangalis, because he was the secretary of the Democritus League, which was 'not favourably regarded by ASIO', and because only 137 passengers left Melbourne on the *Cyrenia*, and of these 24 named Cyprus as their destination, failing to acknowledge that many could have gone elsewhere, such as to the US. But it admitted that there were over 100 Cypriots unemployed in Melbourne, while the Commonwealth Employment Services told them that there were 150 (Dwyer, 1952; O'Heare to Blair, 1952b 13 June; Blair to O'Heare, 1952, 20 June; O'Heare to CMO, 1952a 11 July; Richards, 1953; Jordan, 2013, pp. 164–72; Piccini & Smith, 2019, pp. 77–96). As Table 3 shows, 1952 had the most Cypriots leaving Australia than any other year in the 1950s at 130. The authorities considered Zangalis a trouble-some communist agitator and the unemployment amongst migrants from Greece and Cyprus was 'strengthening his position', and bringing Cypriots under the control of the larger Greek community (Regional Director, Victoria, 1952).

From 1951, ASIO targeted the CPA given the Liberal government's policy to have it banned, and so even more closely monitored the Atlas Club and the Democritus League. ASIO grew alarmed at most members being Cypriots. Although most supported AKEL more than the CPA, ASIO was still concerned because funds raised were being sent to AKEL (Regional Director, NSW to ASIO, 1954, 12 April). The Greek Communist groups, which met at the rooms of these clubs, were 'very large and active', were mostly 'new Australians' with nationalistic views, and structures, with cells divided between Greeks from Greece, Cypriots and Macedonians, with 'the strongest being amongst the Cypriots' (Senior Field Officer, 1953, 15 May; Democritus League Bulletin, 1953; ASIO, 1953, 5 November; 1954b, 29 January). During this period, the government's strongest action, taken on ASIO's advice, was against Demetris (Jimmy) Anastassiou (Deery, 2005, pp. 40–52). Anastassiou was born in Drymou, Paphos, served in the Cyprus Volunteer Force (CVF420) and the Royal Navy in World War II, and arrived in Australia in July 1949 already a communist. He soon became active for the CPA. On 25 August 1950 he spoke at the Peace Council meeting, which the CPA had organised at Yallourn and in May 1951 became the Vice-President of the communist-dominated Gippsland Trades and Labour Council. Anastassiou was a delegate at the Berlin World Youth Festival in August 1951, returning in January 1952. Holt agreed to stop his re-admission, but it was too late. The Labour MP for Yarra, Stan Keon (expelled in 1955 and a founder of the Democratic Labour Party) (DLP), told Holt on 23 January 1952 that Anastassiou was 'an avowed Communist and a notorious trouble-maker', and 'to deport unnaturalized migrants found to be Communists'. By March 1952 Anastassiou was working full-time for the CPA and the Eureka Youth League in Melbourne, before moving to Sydney

to work from the Atlas Club on recruitment and fundraising for the CPA. On 13 October the Immigration Department recommended, after the head of ASIO had determined that there was 'a strong security objection ... to his remaining in the Commonwealth', his deportation under 5(2) of the Immigration Act. By 6 November Holt had approved. On 18 November police arrested Anastassiou and, on failing the dictation test in Italian, appeared in court the next day charged with being a prohibited immigrant, with the hearing adjourned for 18 December (Report on Anastassiou, 1952, November/December; Keon to Holt, 1952, 23 January; Holt to Keon, 1952, 7 February; Immigration Department, 1952c, 29 May; Immigration Department, 1952a, 13 October; Immigration Department, 1952d, 6 November; Barclay to Laught, 1952, 10 December). Hundreds of protests from various unions, left-wing organisations and the Cypriot and Greek communities, demanded that the proceedings be withdrawn and accused the government of trampling on the rights of a British subject. Anastassiou asked Holt on 25 November to withdraw the proceedings because he had served in the Royal Navy, had no criminal conviction and speaking Italian was not a condition of entry. Holt withdrew the proceedings on 19 December, despite receiving advice two days earlier that it was legal, with precedents and if it was government policy to remove troublesome communists, British subjects or not, this was how. Holt gave no public explanation for his change, but privately claimed, based on advice on 18 December, that 'very important questions of principle arose', including that Anastassiou had not broken the law, his activities had not been subversive, and he was a British subject with a good service record. The case led to the Cabinet deciding in February 1953 to not deport anyone for ideological reasons unless their activities were subversive (NAA, A6980/S200624; A6980/S200395; Report on Anastassiou, 1952, November/December; Field Officer (redacted) to Senior Field Officer, 1952, 26 November; Heyes, 1953a); Holt to Fitzpatrick, 1953, 28 January; Heyes to Holt, 1953a, 16 February; Heyes to Spry, 1953c, 5 May; Anastassiou to (Holt, 1952), 25 November; Holt to Wentworth, undated; Burbridge to Holt, 1952, 17 December; Immigration Department to Holt, 1952b, 18 December; Holt, undated). Anastassiou's release did not stop his activities nor the focus on him by the authorities. In 1954 ASIO reported that Anastassiou wanted to bring his family to Australia from Cyprus, but because he was 'so well known ... the Security people would not allow him to sponsor them' (ASIO, 1954a, 24 July).

With the start of violence in April 1955 by EOKA in pursuit of *enosis*, Anastassiou and the CPA became involved in supporting *enosis* in Australia amongst Greek and Cypriot migrant workers, despite the fact that EOKA was a far-right organization that attacked communists in Cyprus. In Cyprus, AKEL, which was banned by the British later in 1955, continued to support *enosis* but not EOKA. A statement issued by AKEL to the Tribune (1956b, 19 September, p. 4) stated that it supported first and foremost the liberation struggle and although it did not support EOKA's tactics they were the result of British imperialism, and so wanted a united non-violent front to bring about *enosis*. Support for *enosis* in Britain and Australia by the left was blurred (Varnava, 2022a). In December 1955 these activities in Australia became centred on the CPA dominated CCSD. The patron was Clive Evatt, an ALP MP in the NSW state parliament (expelled from the ALP in July 1956), and brother of federal opposition leader, Herbert (Doc) Evatt; the president was Costas Vasili Mournahi, a Cypriot who arrived in Australia in 1947 (NAA, A997/1947/988); but the key figure was Kenneth Buckley, an economic historian at the University of Sydney, who had served as a British intelligence officer in Greece during World War II, had been a member of the CPGB and then the CPA in 1954 soon after arriving in Australia to take up his academic post (CCS, 1956, 16 June; Buckley, 1956, 2008, pp. 122–5). Surveillance started after members of the CCSD distributed pamphlets to Greeks and Cypriots leaving a Sydney Greek Orthodox Church in early December 1955, and then held a meeting at the Building Worker's Industrial Union, when it passed a resolution demanding that the British and Australian authorities ask the UN to intervene in Cyprus in favour of *enosis*. The Greek consul, D. Papadakis, attended the meeting and later said that he did not know if communists had attended, which was erroneous since the Greek consulates throughout the country and the embassy in Canberra were emersed in providing intelligence on Greek and Cypriot communists (article in Melbourne newspaper, 1955, 8 December). Then Anastassiou published articles in the communist

newspapers The Tribune (1955, 20 December, p. 3) and The Guardian (1955, 21 December) attacking British policy in Cyprus and their measures against EOKA and AKEL.

By 1956 the Australian authorities were confronted by large protests in favour of *enosis* led by the CPA and Greek and Cypriot clubs, involving the union movement. On 15 January 1956, 300 Cypriots, Greeks and Australians met at the Atlas Club and resolved to protest to the UN, the British and Australian Prime Ministers, and opposition (labour) leaders, against Whitehall's refusal to recognize the right of the Cypriot people to self-determination, a euphemism for *enosis*. Anastassiou had organized the event as the secretary of the Atlas Club and denied that they had 'subversive aims', claiming that 'while we love Australia ... it is our duty to support the Cypriot people's desire for freedom'. Union leaders and plain-clothed police attended, and another public meeting was planned at the Lower Town Hall on 27 January (Canberra Times, 1956, 16 January, p. 1; Tribune, 1956a, 18 January, p. 11; ASIO, 1956k, 19 January). Then the deportation of Makarios in March 1956 saw Cyprus become an even hotter topic, with The Argus (1956b, 15 March, p. 1; 1956c 19 March, p. 2) sending a journalist, Peter Gladwin, to the island. The CCSD held another public meeting (which was instrumental in suspending the processing of Cypriot applications to migrate to Australia) (Varnava, 2022a) on 25 March, on the insistence of Papadakis because this was a Greek national day commemorating the start of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, protesting the deportation of Makarios, followed by a lecture from Rupert Lockwood, a communist journalist (Invitation to meeting, 1956, 25 March; Report on meeting of the CCS, 1956, 25 March; ASIO, 1956e, 25 March; Tribune, 1956d, 25 March, p. 12; The Argus, 1956a, 12 March, p. 8; Varnava, 2022b, pp. 183–215). The Australian authorities were alarmed by Cypriots associating with Greek communists, as ASIO reported that at a meeting of the Greek Fraction of the CPA members agreed that 'all Greeks support the return of Cyprus to Greece and this is the key to mass communist activity' in Australia (ASIO, 1956d, 9 August).

Enter the ALP

In 1957 a new dimension appeared, the greater involvement of ALP MPs within the CCSD and the activities it led. ALP members had been involved in the CCSD, but only in the background. This changed in 1957. Whether this was helped by Buckley leaving the CPA or not, the Australian authorities were confronted and annoyed by communist migrants using their pro-*enosis* activities to involve the ALP to conceal the communist influence within the CCSD.

At the end of 1956 Buckley published a booklet 'The Facts About Cyprus' where he presented a far-left anti-imperialist position to justify *enosis*, which used many justifications of the far-right EOKA and also aligned with the views of the ALP, evidenced by the introduction provided by Clive Evatt (Tribune, 1956c, 24 October; ASIO, 1956j, 17 October). Buckley started by associating the struggle in Cyprus led by EOKA, which he later admitted was a right-wing organization, with 'the outstanding phenomena of our times, particularly of the last decade ... the struggle of colonial peoples for national independence'. He compared the comments in the House of Commons in 1951 on Sudanese independence with the Tory policy of not granting national independence to Cyprus in 1956, which he hinted was a contradiction because the Cypriots were Greeks and therefore descendants of the ancient Greeks that had originated Western culture (Varnava, 2009, pp. 152–201, 2013, pp. 106–47, 2015, pp. 148–72). He claimed that there were three reasons given to defend the continuation of British rule in Cyprus, that the Cypriots were prosperous and content under British rule; that the Turkish minority needed protecting against the Greek majority; and that there were strategic considerations that rendered it vital that Cyprus remain a British base. He proceeded to dispel these through selective accounts, both historical and contemporary, which resembled the exaggerated and sometimes fabricated accounts provided by Greek Cypriot nationalists, whether from the right or the left. The main thrust of these arguments was that the British had done little to develop the island and its people, that the Cypriots were Greeks, except for the small minority of Turks who had been used by the British to divide the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in order to prevent

what Buckley really thought was the solution in Cyprus, self-determination, which he clarified as *enosis*. As for the British strategic considerations, these he dismissed as 'naked imperialism of an outmoded brand'. Buckley even dismissed the application of the word 'terrorism' to national struggles and to EOKA, and to apply it to describe the British measures against EOKA and more broadly the Cypriot people, which he believed represented 'an attempt by the British colonial administration to terrorise a whole people'. Buckley ended by explaining that because Australia was part of the British Commonwealth it had the right to a say on British policy in Cyprus and that it should exercise that right to further its 'existing friendly relations and sympathies between Australians and Greeks'. He referred to the call in the parliament by Doc Evatt, to Prime Minister Menzies to push the British for such a solution (Buckley, 1956). Left-wing anti-imperialist nationalism and anti-colonialism seemingly trumped the fact that this example of 'anti-colonialism' was led by the far-right, which had collaborated with the fascist/Nazi occupiers of Greece (Varnava, 2021).

Buckley's pamphlet was only one action taken to give further publicity to pro-*enosis* activities in Australia, the other was to send a delegation of prominent Australians to Cyprus on a 'fact-finding' mission.

The CCSD planned to send three people to Cyprus and Britain, and perhaps even to the Seychelles if they obtained permission to interview Makarios. It held a meeting on 28 October at which about 200 people, mainly Greeks and Cypriots, attended at the Building Workers' Industrial Union (BWIU), which was adorned with banners inscribed 'End Colonialism. Self-Determination for Cyprus' and 'Save the Lives of British and Cypriot youths'. Buckley (ASIO, 1956a, 29 October) stated that 'the British Government should decide that "colonialism in the 20th century is outdated and get out of Cyprus"' and that the majority of conflicts in the world were the cause of other countries wanting military bases, such as in Singapore, French North Africa, Hungary and Cyprus. On 7 November all the committees across Australia were represented at a meeting in Sydney, where it was agreed to form a fundraising committee to send three Australians to Cyprus. Papadakis did not attend because he believed that the police were watching. Two letters by Papadakis were read out, one from the 'Central Cypriot Self-Determination Committee' in Athens, led by Savvas Loizides, and the other from the Greek Foreign Ministry, urging the committees in Australia to galvanise the Greeks behind *enosis* and increase propaganda amongst Australians. It was agreed that £3,000 was needed to send three delegates to Cyprus and that Evatt and Buckley would take the lead (ASIO, 1956g, 7 November). In the end funds were raised to send only two delegates and Evatt made way for Don Dunstan, a South Australian state Labor MP, to join Buckley, and they were farewelled at a gathering at the BWIU premises on 7 February 1957 (ASIO, 1957b, 4 February; 1957c, 4 February).

None of this was lost on ASIO. Buckley may have been the only communist and he had recently resigned from the CPA over the Hungarian crisis, and Dunstan was a known anti-communist, yet it knew that 'some of the leading members of the Committee ... are Communists in the Greek communities of Melbourne and Sydney' (ASIO, 1957d, 14 February; 1957j, 14 February). But ASIO's main concerns were the assimilation of Cypriots within the larger Greek community and the large numbers of Greek and Cypriot communists, as well as the more active role now taken by the ALP, with Dunstan accompanying Buckley to Cyprus, Greece and Britain to press for *enosis* and demand that Whitehall investigate accusations of atrocities against Cypriots (Tribune, 1957a, 13 February, p. 3).

The trip caused significant anxieties for the Australian government and for ASIO, and was widely reported upon in the Australian and international press, namely through the American Associated Press and Reuters. On 16 February the Canberra Times (1957b, p. 9) reported on how Dunstan and Buckley were refused access to visit Cypriot detainees at the Pyla Detention Centre near Larnaca, because the director had no authority to allow them. Three days later the Canberra Times (1957c, 19 February, p. 7) reported on the press conference given by Dunstan and Buckley in Nicosia, at which they urged the British government to give Cyprus self-determination, that is *enosis*, and to hold an enquiry into British security operations in the island. Dunstan condemned EOKA terrorism, but defended the stance of Makarios. According

to Dunstan, Makarios had been reasonable in the negotiations with the British, and they had erred in not involving the Greek Cypriot members of the Executive Council (were there any left?). He claimed that his exiling was unjustified and the allegations that he had been involved in terrorist activities could not be proved without Makarios being put on trial. Dunstan continued with his legalistic position, by stating that the emergency regulations allowing for detainment without trial were extraordinary, that these regulations should be repealed and ordinary laws relating to disturbances and libel used to prosecute suspects, and an amnesty for prisoners except where their offence would have been punishable under common law. He also argued that the government had united the Cypriot people against it and behind EOKA with its punitive measures. Buckley and Dunstan arrived in Athens on 17 February and flew to London on 19 February. No members of the Australian embassy or any senior Greek government ministers or officials met them. The Greek press quoted Buckley and Dunstan expressing the view that the Turkish Cypriots had revolted and because they were a minority their wishes should be ignored. In London they criticized the Labour Party and only a handful of Labour MPs met them, and called upon the British government to independently investigate the accusations of atrocities from security forces (ASIO, 1957i, 5 March). The response from the Australian government came from Percy Spender, the Ambassador to the US and former Minister for External Affairs (1949–51), who told the UN on 20 February that the Greek side was to blame for hindering a resolution to the Cyprus issue and that peaceful negotiation was impossible 'in an atmosphere rendered foul by bloodshed and violence', and the 'death and destruction' caused by EOKA would not bring good to the Cypriot people (Canberra Times, 1957d, 21 February, p. 4.).

ASIO had closely monitored the activities of the delegation, even gathering dozens of newspaper clippings from Greek newspapers from Cyprus and Greece (ASIO, 1956i, 16 May; 1956b 29 June; 1956f 1 September; Regional Director, NSW, 1956, 29 October; ASIO, 1956c, 1 November; 1956l 28 October; 1956h, 7 November; 1957e, 4 February; Director General, 1957, 14 February; ASIO, 1957k, 14 February; 1957i 5 March; 1957h 7 May). Its main concern was that the CCSD brought together elements of the ALP and CPA behind a cause that represented two migrant groups that were assimilating in Australia and taking active left-wing stances. As one ASIO report stated, the activities of the Committee should 'not be regarded from the viewpoint of the degree of Communist influence', but as an exercise of a 'united front', since 'self-determination is a subject which finds a common platform with the ALP and the Communist Party of Australia'. The CPA had provided the 'machinery' by starting the CCSD, and were happy to see the ALP more active, 'both as a "front" to conceal the Communist interest, and also as the best means of drawing attention to and publicizing the matter'. It seems that Dunstan was sent to undertake a preliminary survey to see if there was anything in the case to exploit before the 'big guns' in the ALP stepped-out. The CPA were willing to exploit the ALP as they had EOKA, since it was 'prepared to collect and send large sums of money to EOKA', which was clearly 'not a Communist body'. This also explained the support of the Greek consul: 'the Greek Government and the Communist Party of Australia are supporting the same cause, although the Greek Government is violently anti-Communist' (ASIO, 1957a, 15 March). ASIO's report was an accurate assessment and pointed to the fact that ideologies had been swept aside in favour of nationalism and anti-imperialism to create an unusual alliance in support of EOKA. In reporting on the meeting attended by 1,000 at Paddington Town Hall on 18 March 1957 to hear Dunstan and Buckley, the *Tribune* emphasized that the ALP now agreed with the CPA's support for *enosis* (Sydney Morning Herald, 1957, 19 March; Tribune, 1957c, 20 March, p. 11). Buckley reiterated this in the March issue of *The Australian Outlook* (ASIO, 1957f, 1 July). Then in July Doc Evatt visited Athens and stated there that the UN should adopt the view of Makarios because *enosis* was 'fair and just', and he repeated this back in Australia, adding that the Cypriot people deserved the same rights as the 'coloured peoples' of Ghana and Malaya (Canberra Times, 1957a, 10 July, p. 1; 1957e 25 July, p. 1). The united front continued with a public gathering in October 1957 attended by 400 at Assembly

Hall, Sydney, with Doc Evatt, Buckley, and future Labour PM, Gough Whitlam, giving pro-*enosis* speeches (ASIO, 1957g, 28 October).

The CCSD, following in the footsteps of organisations in the UK, including those that involved the left wing of the British Labour Party, also fundraised for EOKA (Varnava, 2022a). In fact ASIO was well aware of not only the fundraising led by the CCSD in Australia, but also by right-and-left wing organisations in the UK (Australian High Commission, London, 1956, 13 June). Although this was masked behind the claim that they were fundraising for the Cypriot people who were suffering from the oppressive British measures against EOKA, which also impacted the general population more broadly, these funds were going directly to EOKA through its affiliated organisations. Despite its communist connections, the CCSD fundraised in Greek Orthodox Churches, and Buckley, who took the lead, was liberated even more to do so when he left the CPA. For example, his ASIO file recorded a newspaper article from *Neos Kosmos* from 27 June, 1957 that he had raised at Sydney churches £300, aided by the Greek Consul, who spoke of the heroism of EOKA from the pulpit. In August 1958, Buckley, now the president of the CCSD and chair of its fundraising committee, then organized a meeting at Lena House, 150 Liverpool Street, Sydney to 'raise funds for relief of Cypriot victims of British imperialism in Cyprus' (Committee for Cypriot Relief Fund, 1958, 17 August). Left-wing Greek Cypriots, such as Costas Athanasiades, who had a substantial ASIO file because of his left-wing activities, were also heavily involved in these fundraising efforts for EOKA (Varnava, 2022a).

The increasing public support of the ALP-left for *enosis* led to its MPs scrutinizing the entry restrictions on Cypriots. Clyde Cameron, the Labor MP for Hindmarsh, who had claimed at the Adelaide meeting at which Dunstan reported on his trip, that Cyprus was being denied self-determination because of British Middle East oil interests (Tribune, 1957b, 16 April, p. 10), asked in May 1957 why Cypriots were being refused entry to Australia to reunite with families. Townley fobbed him off by replying that Cypriots were coming to Australia 'in groups' (Hansard, 1957, 16 May). But then Eddie Ward, the long-standing Labor MP for East Sydney, accused the government of selecting Cypriots for 'special attention' and 'political tests'. He demanded a review for a Turkish Cypriot, Ali, who was being deported after coming to Australia without a landing permit, which he was denied after applying in Australia, although he was a British subject and spoke good English (Daily Mirror, 1957, 28 August, p. 23). The main criticism of the government came, however, from Cameron, who had on several occasions criticized the Australian government for not supporting the self-determination of Cyprus, that is, *enosis* (Tribune, 1958a, 1 January, p. 3; 1958g 7 May, p. 10). He told the government in 1958 that several Greek and Cypriot societies had protested to him against the government's 'policy of discrimination against Cypriots who desire to migrate to Australia', particularly because Cypriots were British subjects and 'should not be forced to suffer restrictions which do not apply to certain groups of non-British subjects'. Downer, the Immigration Minister, replied that there was no such discrimination because they belonged to the Mediterranean and Cypriot immigration was 'governed by the immigration policies which apply to the group as a whole'. The restrictions on Southern Europeans were introduced some years ago to allow for a balance with Northern Europeans, which was 'considered essential if we are to avoid serious assimilation problems'. That Cypriots were British 'does not in any real way effect the issue', and if one were to take the British empire as a whole 'far more British subjects are subject to restrictions with regard to admission'. The only 'British subjects who are allowed to come to Australia without restriction are the English-speaking peoples of the United Kingdom or the direct descendants of such peoples, which the existence of a common language and a common cultural pattern create no significant assimilation problems in Australia'. Downer added: 'I have a very high regard for the people of Cyprus, many of whom have made admirable settlers in this country. This does not, however, avoid the fact that basically they are non-English speaking and are accustomed to a pattern of life which does create assimilation difficulties here' (Cameron, 1958, 9 October; Heyes, 1958d, October; Downer, 1958, 25 November). Downer's response had been based on advice from Heyes (Heyes, 1958a, 19 November), and he also

stipulated the concerns of his department that the majority of Cypriots arriving as visitors were staying on after the expiry of their authorised visit, sighting the violence in Cyprus as 'an excuse'. For this reason, the department had to ensure that prospective Cypriot visitors were bona fide and so applicants must be examined 'more carefully than usual' (Heyes, 1958b, 20 November; Heyes, 1958c, 27 November).

In 1958 the CPA and ALP continued to attack the Australian and British governments on their respective policies on Cyprus and to support *enosis* through their various activities, including public gatherings involving the Cypriot and Greek communities. But the ALP went quiet after Makarios proposed independence in September 1958 and in the lead-up to and following its poor performance at the November 1958 federal election. In June 1958 it was the turn of Clive Evatt to visit Athens, where he told a public meeting that the Cypriot people deserved the right to self-determination (Canberra Times, 1958f, 7 June, p. 6). On his arrival he had been met by Savvas Loizides (Canberra Times, 1958b, 12 June, p. 20), who was a member of the Cypriot Ethnarchy Council in Athens and until the May 1958 Greek elections was an MP for the ruling right-wing National Radical Union and its representative at the UN on Cyprus, before falling foul with the leadership of his party over his extreme views on Cyprus. Loizides belonged to the far-right. It was likely that Loizides, who was exiled from Cyprus in 1931 for his role in riots against British rule as the leader of the far-right National Radical Union of Cyprus (EREK), had been behind the assassination of the leading Cypriot politician, Antonios Triantafyllides, in January 1934, and it is known that he was a collaborator during the Second World War, and one of the masterminds behind EOKA, which he modelled on EREK (Varnava, 2021). Evatt, following in the footsteps of Dunstan and Buckley, next visited Cyprus and the UK. In London he accused the British authorities of complicity in the Turkish Cypriot violence that had recently erupted. He stated that Cyprus was being run as a 'police state', that the Australian people 'hate colonialism [and] the troubles in Cyprus are due to colonialism', and that he had seen 'criminal acts' while in Cyprus against Greek Cypriots, and demanded a royal commission to investigate (Canberra Times, 1958c, 18 June, p. 11; 1958a 24 June, p. 1). While Clive Evatt was making waves abroad, his brother went quiet in Australia. Aside from some comments during the peace week rally in June, where he stated that the Cypriots deserved self-government, which was a different solution to self-determination, Evatt and the ALP said little about Cyprus aside from Cameron's questions in parliament (Canberra Times, 1958d, 21 June, p. 3; 1958e 25 June, p. 3). On the other hand, the CPA did not cease its activities and attacks. On 16 July the Tribune (1958c, p. 2) called on all workers to 'protest against Cypriot murders', not those committed by EOKA, but only those committed by the British and their supporters, which had 'turned Cyprus into an island of slaughter and terror'. On 6 August the Tribune (1958f, p. 4) criticized the British government for 'inflaming the Turkish minority against the Greeks', which was and remains the criticism of Greek Cypriot nationalists, attacking the actions of Sir Hugh Foot, who replaced Harding in December 1957, and the Partnership Plan of the Prime Minister's, Harold Macmillan, as 'partition', and that the British should just get out and let the Greeks and Turks live in peace (Varnava, 2010, pp. 79–106). It next reported on a meeting of 'Greek citizens' in Sydney, who cabled Macmillan and the UN Secretary General to protest against the mass detentions in Cyprus, and the memorial services held in the three 'Greek churches in Sydney in honor of Greeks who had died in the struggle for freedom in Cyprus' (Tribune, 1958b, 13 August, p. 10). Then, as the election approached, the Tribune (1958e, p. 2), on 5 November, reported on the letter sent by the Glebe Branch of the CPA in Sydney to the British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd in protest at the treatment of Cypriot detainees. Then a few days following the 22 November federal election, in which the CPA lost about half its vote from the last election, the Tribune (1958d, 26 November, p. 4) claimed that the British authorities were employing 'Nazi-type punishment for Cyprus' in order to 'batter them into submission'. The article stated that EOKA was 'right-wing' and by banning AKEL the 'imperialists did their best to present EOKA with the leadership of the independence movement'. This was an interesting statement since EOKA had

never supported independence, but had only one uncompromising aim, *enosis*, which was supported by AKEL and internationally by communist parties, including the CPA, and labour/social democratic parties, none of which supported independence as an option.

Conclusion and postscript

The politics of multiculturalism were well and truly alive in 1950s Australia, certainly, as this case has shown, within the CPA and the left faction of the ALP. The majority of Greeks arriving in inter-war and post-war Australia were left-wing or from left-wing families that had suffered persecution during the Metaxas dictatorship, the Axis occupation and then the civil war, which they lost to the right-wing Royalist forces supported by the UK and U.S.A. For left-wing Cypriots, the context was different, though with the same end results, as the majority of inter-war and post-war migrants were left-wing or open to left-wing ideas, fleeing British colonial rule that had suppressed the left and had done little to develop the economy of the country in line with the growing workforce. These Greek and Cypriot migrants, like other Mediterranean migrants, especially from Italy and Malta, found jobs easily in the factories in Australia that were springing up to buttress Australian industrialization and manufacturing. It was in these factories that they were introduced, or reintroduced in the case of Cypriots who were familiar with trade unions, to the Australian trade union movement that was dominated by the CPA and the ALP-left. The CPA was particularly robust in supporting the rights of migrant workers and advocating for a slow-down in further arrivals, in including migrants within its organization and supporting what were perceived to be popular national causes back in the 'old countries' of the migrants, especially those that were anti-imperial. With these tactics the CPA aimed at increasing its electoral support by creating a base from within the left-wing 'New Australians' arriving. It was a similar story for the ALP-left. Although the ALP split in 1955 over the CPA influence within the trade union movement, with the formation of the DLP, by 1956 those in the ALP-left were working more closely with the CPA in support of migrant worker rights and causes. The CCSD is a good example of this cooperation. The split within the CPA in 1956 allowed the ALP-left to take a more prominent leading role in the activities of the CCSD and more generally in advocating for Cypriot migrants, whether as regards their rights or perceived national causes.

This case study has shown that both the CPA and ALP-left were keen to exploit the possible electoral support of Greek and Cypriot migrants by advocating openly for their national causes. It was not difficult for the CPA and the ALP-left to support anti-colonial movements given their anti-imperialism, or to support left-wing nationalist causes. Both acknowledged but did not care that in supporting the Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis* they were supporting EOKA, a far-right group leading an armed struggle against the British and Cypriots opposed to *enosis*. That the EOKA leadership were far-right, including wartime collaborators in Greece, were set aside in pursuit of anti-imperialism and pro-liberation nationalism, by camouflaging the demand for *enosis* behind 'self-determination'. The CPA and ALP-left also conveniently emphasized the British banning of AKEL as the reason why it could not fully participate in the 'movement for self-determination', when the real reason was that EOKA had excluded AKEL from its activities and targeted left-wing Cypriots, whether affiliated with AKEL or not. So the CPA and ALP-left took a pro-*enosis* line thinking that it would win over Greek and Cypriot workers in Australia and presented this line as justified by anti-imperialism regardless of the leading role of the far-right in Cyprus and Greece.

In doing so the CPA and ALP-left accepted the Greek and Cypriot position on the Turkish Cypriot community. This view had various elements. First, that the Turkish Cypriots were pro-imperialists for initially supporting the continuation of British rule and later for advocating for partition, in which Turkey would receive a share of Cyprus. Second, that as a minority they did not have the right to veto the view of the majority, which was supposedly in favour of *enosis*. Third, once Cyprus was united to Greece the Turkish Cypriots would be better off as they would receive protected minority rights and status. All three of these claims were fundamentally flawed. The first did not recognize that *enosis* was itself inherently imperialist (not merely irredentist),

since it not only meant the expansion of Greece it meant so at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots, and many other Cypriots, including Greek Cypriots, who opposed it (Varnava, 2012, pp. 219–40). As for the second point, this revolved upon the view that the British had applied 'divide and rule' in Cyprus, in which they played the Greek and Turkish Cypriots off each other. This was untrue as the British had focused on protecting the Turkish Cypriots from the demands of the Greek Cypriot elites for *enosis*, and only employed 'divide and rule' in the final years when in combating EOKA they were forced to rely on the Turkish Cypriots because EOKA was successfully killing Greek Cypriot civil servants, especially in the police. The CPA and ALP, as with left-wing parties in the UK, and AKEL, failed to develop an alternative to the violent *enosis* path built by EOKA. This other non-violent path towards liberation, which had existed in political circles in Cyprus, was the 'constitutional path', which could have been, as with the Maltese example, peaceful, pro-independence as well anti-imperial and anti-colonial (Varnava, 2021). Lastly, it is quite illustrative of the obsession within the far-left in both the UK and Australia that while the ALP was relatively silent, at least publicly, on the agreements in 1959 that ended the conflict and aimed to establish an independent Cyprus, the CPA and the Tribune (1959, 4 March, p. 4), following the CPGB and the *London Daily Worker*, condemned the agreements, as the 'infamous Cyprus plan', because it rejected self-determination/*enosis*.

Note

1. It is telling that 1.3 million Anatolian Greeks left Turkey as part of the population exchange in 1924, out of a population in 1914 estimated at about 1.7 million. This indicates that in total about 400,000 had fled or perished between 1915 and 1923.

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