



Distinguishing between genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (1914–23) and why this matters

Andrekos Varnava

To cite this article: Andrekos Varnava (2025) Distinguishing between genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (1914–23) and why this matters, Griffith Law Review, 34:2, 160-177, DOI: [10.1080/10383441.2024.2413741](https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2024.2413741)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/10383441.2024.2413741>



© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 22 Oct 2024.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 5322



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)

Distinguishing between genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (1914–23) and why this matters

Andrekos Varnava  ^{a,b}

^aHistory Discipline, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia; ^bSchool of Humanities, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK (Honorary)

ABSTRACT

The last decades of the Ottoman Empire were characterised by mass violence that saw millions, mostly Ottoman Christians, perishing and forcibly moved within Ottoman borders, or expelled out. While it is generally accepted (except by Turkey and pro-Turkish commentators) that what befell the Armenians in 1915 and 1916 was a Genocide, in recent years many have taken to calling what befell other Ottoman Christians as a genocide as well, referring to a genocide of Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians from 1915 to 1923, and some even to a 30-year genocide. This essay attempts to scrutinise this recent trend, by contrasting what happened to the Armenians and the Greeks during the last years of the Ottoman Empire and during the rise of Nationalist Turkey, namely from 1915 to 1923. It first distinguishes between the terms genocide, genocidal and ethnic cleansing. It then establishes that population numbers are pivotal to genocide, as those killed and those that survived are important to evidence intent and application. The article then delves into the cases, comparing and contrasting across the criteria of intent and destruction processes, and the number of dead and survived. Finally, the article answers why the Armenian case (1915–16) is a Genocide, but not the Greek case (1915–23) or that of the Armenian case (1919–23). This article is important for the overall special issue on mass deportation because it clarifies the differences between various genocidal processes, including mass deportation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 25 May 2024

Accepted 2 October 2024

KEYWORDS

Genocide; ethnic cleansing; forced internal relocation; mass deportation; Ottoman Empire; Ottoman Christians; Turkish national movement

Introduction

In 2009, when I had just arrived in Adelaide to begin my position as a Lecturer in History at Flinders University, several journalists approached me to comment on the South Australian parliament recognising a genocide against the Armenian, Greek, Assyrian and other Christian minorities of the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923.¹ I was then a young scholar and refused to be drawn into the debate. I had not done the minimum

CONTACT Andrekos Varnava  andrekos.varnava@flinders.edu.au  History Discipline, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

research into the subject, although I had views based on preliminary research. Also, I was not sure if parliaments and governments not involved in let alone responsible for the events should be drawn into formally recognising historical genocides or such events. I was concerned – and remain so – about the involvement of politicians, journalists and community leaders behind lobby groups, with evident biases and vested interests.² But because parliaments and governments have since interfered in this historical question and I have published research on it, I think it is important to comment.³

In the years since, the discussions and debates, within and outside academia have continued. While there is general agreement, notwithstanding the protests from the Turkish government and their supporters,⁴ that there was an Armenian Genocide, there has also been some confusion about its dating and whether other Christian communities were also victims of a genocide. So there are some scholars which say that the Armenian Genocide occurred in 1915 and 1916,⁵ others from 1915 to 1923,⁶ and those who date it as a 30 year genocide from the massacres in the 1890s.⁷ Other scholars and activists have attempted to include other Christian communities, which were also subjected to mass violence and expulsion, namely the Ottoman Greek, including the Pontian, and Assyrian communities.⁸ In December 2007 the International Association of Genocide Scholars

¹Panayiotis Diamadis, 'Controversies around Governmental and Parliamentary Recognition of the Armenian, Hellenic and Armenian Genocides' in Henry Theriault, Elisa Von Joeden-Forgey and Samuel Totten (eds), *Controversies in the Field of Genocide Studies* (Routledge 2017) 91–152.

²Alexandros Logothetis, 'Politicians clash over Pontian genocide' *Neos Kosmos* (6 April 2009); Anastasios Papapostolou, 'SA 'yes' to genocide motion' *Neos Kosmos* (4 May 2009); 'Pontian Professionals Honour Michael Atkinson' *Neos Kosmos* (2 November 2009); Andriana Simos, 'Koutsantonis MP to lead motion to recognise Greek Genocide Remembrance Day in SA' *The Greek Herald* (6 May 2021); John Voutos, 'Remembrance Day for the Genocide of Pontic Greeks: 10 things you may not know' *The Greek Herald* (18 May 2021).

³Andrekos Varnava, *British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914–1925: Empire, Loyalties and Democratic Deficit* (Routledge 2020) 135–44; Andrekos Varnava and Trevor Harris, "'It is quite impossible to receive them': Saving the Musa Dagħ Refugees and the Imperialism of European Humanitarianism' (2018) 90(4) *Journal of Modern History* 834; Andrekos Varnava's review of Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford Uni Press 2014) *Genocide Studies and Prevention* (2016) 10(1) 121; Andrekos Varnava, 'French and British Post-War Imperial Agendas and Forging an Armenian Homeland after the Genocide: The Formation of the *Légion d'Orient* in October 1916' (2014) 57(4) *The Historical Journal* 997; Andrekos Varnava, 'Imperialism First, the War Second: The British, an Armenian Legion, and Deliberations on where to Attack the Ottoman Empire, November 1914–April 1915' (2014) 87(237) *Historical Research* 533.

⁴Those that reject the label of Armenian Genocide: Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914–1923* (Uni of Utah Press 2012); Edward J. Erickson, *Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency* (Palgrave 2013); Michael M. Gunter, *Armenian History and the Question of Genocide* (Palgrave 2011); Haluk Selvi, *Armenian Question: From the First World War to the Treaty of Lausanne* (Sakarya Uni 2007). Those that have explored the discussion and denial as a genocidal process: Richard G. Hovannisian, 'Denial of the Armenian Genocide 100 Years Later: The New Practitioners and Their Trade' (2015) 9(2) *Genocide Studies International* 228; Marc A. Mamigonian, 'Academic Denial of the Armenian Genocide in American Scholarship: Denialism as Manufactured Controversy' (2015) 9(1) *Genocide Studies International* 61; Andrekos Varnava's review of Yücel Güçlü, *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914–1923* (Uni of Utah Press 2012) *Reviews in History* (Institute of Historical Research May 2013) review no. 1419.

⁵Ari Şekeryan, *The Armenians and the Fall of the Ottoman Empire: After Genocide, 1918–1923* (Cambridge Uni Press 2023); Andrekos Varnava review of Fatma Müge Göçek's, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009* (Oxford Uni Press 2014) *Genocide Studies and Prevention* (2016) 10(1) 121; Varnava, 'Review of *Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia, 1914–1923*'; Tessa Hofmann, 'The Genocide against the Ottoman Armenians: German Diplomatic Correspondence and Eyewitness Testimonies' (2015) 9(1) *Genocide Studies International* 22; Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (I.B. Tauris 2011); Donald Bloxham, 'The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy' (2003) 181 *Past & Present* 141.

⁶Alfred de Zayas, 'The Genocide against the Armenians 1915–1923 and the Relevance of the 1948 Genocide Convention' (2012) 53(1–4) *Armenian Review* 85; Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus* (Berghahn 2003).

⁷Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide, Turkey's Destruction of its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924* (Harvard Uni Press 2019).

(IAGS) passed a resolution affirming that the 1914–23 campaign against Ottoman Greeks constituted genocide ‘qualitatively similar’ to the Armenian Genocide.⁹ One scholar has rightly criticised the process that led to the passing of the resolution because it was taken by an online vote, which included activists, and thus was not the same as a peer-review process or restricted to academic scholarly experts.¹⁰ There have been passionate and emotional efforts from activists and lobby groups to have an Armenian, Greek and Assyrian genocide recognised by parliaments and governments, especially in the US, Australia and the EU, with parliaments as diverse as those in Greece and Cyprus (1994), Sweden (2010), Armenia (2015), and numerous states in the US and Australia, recognising such a genocide, including the South Australian parliament mentioned above in 2009, which paved the way for the NSW (2013) and Tasmanian (2023) ones to follow.¹¹ Academic and public discourses and debates have confused and conflated genocide, genocidal acts, and ethnic cleansing, often using these terms interchangeable as if they are the same thing.¹² This is especially true of the idea of a ‘Greek Genocide’ and a ‘Pontian Genocide’.¹³ Several works on these by writers who were not trained or practicing historians, often with ancestors who survived, who adopt the terms without critical reflection.¹⁴

This is not the first time that a historian questions the idea of a ‘Greek Genocide’. In July 2023 the historian Erik Sjöberg published a review of *The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Diaries* edited by Robert Shenk, a Professor of English, and Sam Koktzoglou, a retired mechanical engineer, whose father survived the ordeal, where he questioned the appropriateness of the term ‘Greek Genocide’. I agree almost entirely with his arguments and criticisms, which my essay below will build upon. Sjöberg published two relevant monographs on the period, especially his *The Making of the Greek Genocide*, in which he meticulously and systematically showed how use of the term ‘genocide’ for the Ottoman Greek catastrophe has emerged as a contested collective memory and has been uncritically applied, sometimes for political ends.¹⁵ In his review, he argued

⁸Erik Sjöberg, *The Making of the Greek Genocide: Contested Memories of the Ottoman Greek Catastrophe* (Berghahn Books 2016); Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, ‘The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire, 1913–1923: A Comprehensive Overview’ (2015) 9(1) *Genocide Studies International* 104; Tessa Hofmann, Matthias Bjørnlund and Vasileios Meichanetsidis (eds), *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912–1922) and Its Aftermath* (Aristide D. Caratzas 2011); Nikolaos Hlamides, ‘The Greek Relief Committee: America’s Response to the Greek Genocide’ (2008) 3(3) *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 375.

⁹Resolution: International Association of Genocide Scholars, 2007. <https://genocidescholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/IAGS-Resolution-Assyrian-and-Greek-Genocide.pdf>.

¹⁰Erik Sjöberg, ‘Response to Koktzoglou’ *Ergon* (15 February 2024).

¹¹Panayiotis Diamadis, ‘Controversies around Governmental and Parliamentary Recognition of the Armenian, Hellenic and Armenian Genocides’ in Henry Theriault, Elisa Von Joeden-Forgey and Samuel Totten (eds), *Controversies in the Field of Genocide Studies* (Routledge 2017). For a take on New Zealand, see Maria Armoudian and Katherine Smits, ‘How Soon We Forget: National Myth-Making and Recognition of the Armenian Genocide’ (2023) *Journal of Genocide Research* online.

¹²Varnava review of Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789–2009*.

¹³Gevorg Vardanyan, ‘The Greek Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Parallels with the Armenian Genocide’ in George N. Shirinian (ed), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913–1923* (Berghahn 2017) 274–99; Vasileios Th. Meichanetsidis, ‘The Genocide of the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire’ (2015) 9(1) *Genocide Studies International* 104; T. Malkides, *Η Γενοκτονία των Ελλήνων: Θράκη, Μικρά Ασία, Πόντος* [*The Greek Genocide: Thrace, Asia Minor, Pontus*] (Egeyon 2010); Constantinos Fotiadis, *The Genocide of the Pontus Greeks by the Turks* (Herodotus 2004).

¹⁴Thea Halo, ‘The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 1913–1923: Myths and Facts’ in George N. Shirinian (ed), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913–1923* (Berghahn 2017) 300–22; Sam Koktzoglou from: Robert Shenk and Sam Koktzoglou (eds), *The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Diaries* (Uni of New Orleans Press 2021).

that the Turkish Nationalist leadership instituted a policy to ethnically cleanse Anatolia of the Greek (Rum) population, and in the Pontus, bordering the Black Sea, they deported the population inland in case any disloyal elements joined a Greek landing, which never transpired, and to better use them in an exchange with Muslims in Greece. Although the policy resembled in character the Ottoman policy of genocide against the Armenians in 1915, with the compulsory drafting of Greeks into the labour battalions where many perished, the deportation of women, children and elderly without the necessary provisions, and even the executions of community leaders, and was carried-out by the same officials and irregulars involved, there were important differences. One was the fact that there was no evidence that the intention was to exterminate the population as was the case with the orders from Talaat Pasha in respect of the Armenians in 1915. Another reason was that the Turkish Nationalists wanted the Greeks alive so they could exchange them with Muslims in Greece. As Sjöberg shows, such negotiations had occurred in 1913 after the Balkan Wars and were halted when the Ottomans joined the Central Powers, when they stopped the persecution of the Greeks because Germany wanted Greece to remain neutral. When Venizelos set-up a second pro-Entente government in Salonica in 1916 and French and British troops, with Venizelist forces, established the Macedonian Front,¹⁶ the persecutions recommenced. This time they included forced relocations to the interior and an exchange of populations might be on the cards. Obviously, those implementing the orders to relocate the Greeks could not control their violent urges, not understanding the broader context of cynically keeping the Greeks alive.¹⁷

The reply from Koktzoglou¹⁸ was dismissive and defensive. He claimed that Sjöberg had been unfair to describe Shenk, who had since died, as sympathetic to the idea of a Greek Genocide, which was unusual since Shenk had clearly accepted the term ‘Greek Genocide’ – although it is interesting that he did not use this term in his 2012 monograph or 2017 book chapter, using the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ instead.¹⁸ Koktzoglou even said that Dr Shenk was no longer around to defend his contribution to the book, which hinted that the book could not be criticised, which is antithetical to vigorous academic practice. He also dismissed Sjöberg’s references to other works that showed the problems with using the term ‘Greek Genocide’ as calculated to ‘obscure’ the story, by referring to the book by Benny Morris and Dror Ze’evi, neither of whom had previously published on the subject, which argued for a 30-year genocide against the Christians by ‘Turkey’.¹⁹ Their book was heavily criticised by scholars in the field for lacking nuance, being selective in its sources and analysis, and for their uncritical use of terms, especially

¹⁵Sjöberg (n 8); Erik Sjöberg, *Internationalism and the New Turkey: American Peace Education in the Kemalist Republic, 1923–1933* (Palgrave Macmillan 2022).

¹⁶Andrekos Varnava, *Serving the Empire in the Great War: The Cypriot Mule Corps, Imperial Identity and Silenced Memory* (Manchester University Press 2017) 58–60. For the impact on Greeks in Australia, see Yianni Cartledge and Andrekos Varnava, ‘Making and Monitoring a “Suspect Community”: Australian Attacks on Greeks and the “Secret Census” in 1916’ (2024) 55(3) *Australian Historical Studies* 485.

¹⁷Erik Sjöberg, ‘Review of Robert Shenk and Sam Koktzoglou (eds), *The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Diaries*’ *Ergon* (27 July 2023); Sjöberg (n 8) 34–43.

¹⁸Robert Shenk, ‘Ethnic Cleansing, American Women and the Admiral: Deep in Anatolia during the Turkish National Revolution’ in George N. Shirinian (ed), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913–1923* (Berghahn 2017) 187–213; Robert Shenk, *America’s Black Sea Fleet: The US Navy amidst War and Revolution* (Naval Institute Press 2012).

¹⁹Sam Koktzoglou, ‘Response to Sjöberg’ *Ergon* (undated).

as they are legal terms, and for being deeply Islamophobic. Koktzoglou did not address or understand the criticism that the naval war diaries cannot evidence the intent to exterminate the Anatolian Greeks because only official orders from the Turkish Nationalist leadership can do that. Instead, Koktzoglou repeated what cannot be possible, that the intent was proved by the reports from US commanders and tobacco businessmen, Near East Relief workers and other foreigners, when all they can report upon is what they witnessed.²⁰

In his response, Sjöberg stated: 'the testimonies of foreign observers are important primary sources but do not reveal as much about the perpetrators' intentions toward the Anatolian Greeks'. Only the Turkish sources can evidence intent. He clarified that the intent was to 'rid Anatolia of its [Greek] Christian minorities', which was to be achieved with ethnic cleansing, the occasional genocidal act, and not genocide.²¹ This accorded with his previous conclusions and with the findings of other eminent scholars in the field, including Nicholas Doumanis, who has Anatolian Greek dissent.²²

This essay breaks down the relevant case studies to suitably label each. It does not explore the Assyrians. On them, I agree with Sjöberg that there were no orders to exterminate the Assyrians, but they were swept up by the extermination of the Armenians in 1915 and 1916. The intent was not with the Ottoman government leadership, but at the lower level and with the irregulars, the perpetrators on the ground. It is important to also note that the Ottoman government neither cared nor stopped this extermination. More research is needed to determine whether this was therefore a genocide ordered and implemented by regional authorities without the backing of the central authority.²³

This article is important for the overall special issue on mass deportation because it clarifies the differences between various genocidal processes, including mass deportation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. In order to achieve this, it takes what might be termed a moderately conservative approach what should be termed as genocide, as other historians have also done.²⁴ The cases are explored so that contrasts can be clearly made across time, government (perpetrator) and community (victim), as well as across typologies, namely genocide, genocidal acts, and ethnic cleansing. The cases are: Armenian Genocide, 1915–16; Ottoman internal displacement of Ottoman Greeks, 1916–18; Turkish ethnic cleansing of Anatolian Greeks, 1919–22; and Turkish ethnic cleansing of Armenians, 1919–22. Ultimately the question is: why is the Armenian case (1915–16) a Genocide, but not the later Greek cases (1916–18 & 1919–22) or Armenian (1919–22) cases?

²⁰Grigor Suny Ronald, 'Since the Centennial: New Departures in the Scholarship on the Armenian Genocide 2015–2021' in Thomas Kühne, Mary Jane Rein and Marc A. Mamigonian (eds), *Documenting the Armenian Genocide: Essays in Honor of Taner Akçam* (Springer Nature 2023) 289; Vicken Chetarian, 'When Two Israeli Historians Discover (the other) Genocide' *Agos* (13 September 2019); Mark Levene, 'Through a Glass Darkly: The Resurrection of Religious Fanaticism as First Cause of Ottoman Catastrophe' (2020) 22(4) *Journal of Genocide Research* 553; David Gutman, 'The Thirty Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924' (2019) 21(1) *Turkish Studies* 1.

²¹Erik Sjöberg, 'Response to Koktzoglou' *Ergon* (15 February 2024).

²²Sjöberg (n 8) 223–37; Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late-Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford Uni Press 2013) 33–36 & 154–6.

²³David Gaunt, 'The Complexity of the Assyrian Genocide' (2015) 9(1) *Genocide Studies International* 83.

²⁴In addition to the work cited elsewhere by Sjöberg, see Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik J. Schaller, *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah* (Cronos 2003).

Definitions

Definitions are important, especially when discussing something as serious and contentious as labelling events of mass violence as genocide, genocidal acts, or ethnic cleansing. They have an origin and an evolution, as they may change over time, and also there may be disagreement over them. In the case of both genocide and ethnic cleansing there is also a legal dimension. It is not my purpose to go into an in-depth historical treatment or analysis of countless definitions for each, but to provide a basic understanding of the historical and legal context, before providing my own definition, without these being definitive or authoritative. I do so merely to point out the important differences between genocide and ethnic cleansing, so that it is clear what makes something a genocide and what makes something ethnic cleansing, without discounting the possibility of ethnic cleansing also exhibiting genocidal characteristics.

The origins and history of the term ‘genocide’ provide the original intentions and meanings behind the definition of the typology. As is well established, the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin created the term genocide in his 1944 book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* by combining the Greek word γένος (‘genos’, meaning a genus of people, marked by some common denominator, such as race, ethnicity, religion, etc ...) with the Latin suffix – caedo (meaning the act of killing).²⁵ This is important because the origin of the meaning of the term genocide is not simply the act of mass killing, but the aim to exterminate a genus and not merely to remove them from a specific territory. Lemkin first became fascinated about mass killing to achieve an extermination of a genus as a crime against humanity during the 1921 trial of Soghomon Tehlirian for the assassination of Talaat Pasha, one of the architects of the Armenian Genocide.²⁶ Thus, the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and 1916 was the historical exemplar for Lemkin’s creation of the typology of genocide, and thus must be classed as a genocide. Also in his notes, Lemkin only referred to massacres and deportation – before he coined the term genocide – for the years 1915 and 1916, indicating that these were the years when the genocide occurred and not the later years, 1919–22.²⁷ In his 1944 book, he listed the five criteria for a genocide and although basing these on his understanding of the Holocaust (‘Holocaust’ was not commonly applied to the genocide of Europe’s Jews until the 1950s), he did so with the Armenian Genocide foremost in his mind, so that his criteria applied to it too. Importantly, Lemkin never included what befell the Ottoman Greeks from 1916 to 1923 or the Armenians from 1919 to 1923 in his definition of genocide, though he knew about them.²⁸

The five criteria formed the basis of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9

²⁵Raphaël Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Columbia Uni Press 1944).

²⁶Vartkes Yeghiayan, *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian* (2nd edn, Center for Armenian Remembrance 2006).

²⁷Raphael Lemkin, *Raphael Lemkin’s Dossier on the Armenian Genocide* intro. Michael J. Bazyler (Center for Armenian Remembrance 2008).

²⁸Stephen Leonard Jacobs, ‘The Complicated Cases of Soghomon Tehlirian and Sholem Schwartzbard and Their Influences on Raphaël Lemkin’s Thinking About Genocide’ (2019) 13(1) *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 33; Douglas Irvin-Erickson, *Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide* (Uni of Pennsylvania Press 2017); Steven Leonard Jacobs, ‘Lemkin on Three Genocides: Comparing his Writings on the Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek Genocides’ in George N. Shirinian (ed), *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913–1923* (Berghahn 2017) 253–73; Dominik Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, *The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a Historian of Mass Violence* (Routledge 2009).

December 1948 and came into effect on 12 January 1951 (Resolution 260 (III)).²⁹ These are captured by Article 2:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 2 is the legal definition of the crime of genocide and is thus the basis for any definition of the term, though the evolution of the definition and the crime must also be factored.

The question of 'in whole or in part' is important. This was added as Lemkin and others had in mind the fact that not all the Jews had perished in the Holocaust and not all the Armenians had perished during the Armenian Genocide, but a substantial part of both had been. Genocide was not about whether the perpetrators had succeeded in exterminating an entire genus, but their intent to do so in whole or in part. Although 'in part' is left vague, given the background to the creation of the typology, especially Lemkin's thinking, the two exemplars of the Armenians and Jews, which had over 50 per cent of their pre-genocide populations perish, indicates that death and transfer to other groups (overall losses for the victim group) must be of a similar destructive volume.³⁰

Taking the above into account, there are certain indicators and characteristics that mark an event as genocide, which need clarifying. At the heart of the term is the intent, knowledge and negligence of the perpetrator, supported by their attempt to exterminate or destroy in part or in whole a genus, that is, a racial, national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic group, through various processes of destruction (that are genocidal), which can happen sequentially or not. These processes to achieve extermination or the destruction of a group include the killing of the elite, the mass killing of the general population, such as but not limited to putting them on death marches to nowhere, or in gas chambers, their forced starvation, their mass rape, the kidnapping and transferring of persons to another group, the appropriation of properties, and the destruction of the cultural heritage of that group. These processes combine elements of physical and biological destruction of a genus, in conjunction with their destruction as a social and cultural unit.

Often the term 'genocidal acts' is used, sometimes interchangeably with 'genocide' and sometimes with 'ethnic cleansing'. Genocidal acts are the processes that together lead to the conclusion that a genocide has been committed. However, when some of these acts are not present, we still refer to the acts as genocidal, and therefore they fall in one or more ways short of genocide. In other words, while there may be cases where genocidal acts were committed, they fall short of genocide for some reason(s), such as the intention was not to destroy the genus in whole or substantial part, the mass killing was not official policy but implemented by overzealous subordinates who had no defined policy, or there may not have been the intention to exterminate the persecuted group, but rather to expel

²⁹The Convention was accessed here: https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

³⁰Irvin-Erickson (n 28).

it by using massacre and other genocidal acts to move others along.³¹ Genocidal acts, therefore, refer to specific actions taken against groups that may or may not contribute to a broader objective of genocide. Recognising this difference allows for more precise legal accountability and fosters a deeper understanding of the mechanisms driving such atrocities. An example is how in the case of the UN Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the case against Krstic, it was found that the massacre of Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica was a genocide, but not the overall genocidal acts against Bosnian Muslims, which was referred to as ethnic cleansing. It may have been better to have referred to the Srebrenica massacre as a genocidal act, since in this case it fell short of in whole or substantial part.

What then is the definition of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and how does it differ from ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal acts’? After all, if they were all the same, why would we need different terms? Unlike ‘genocide’, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ is descriptive, combining the words ‘ethnic’ with ‘cleansing’, which refers to the cleansing of an ethnic group from a specific territory. Although we can legitimately accept that the word ‘genus’ could be applied here for a more inclusive capture of groups, the word cleansing is really what distinguishes ‘ethnic cleansing’ from ‘genocide’. Although there is no one moment, like with ‘genocide’, for when the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ appeared or even when it became commonly used, there are historical instances of the use of variations which are insightful. In the 1860s the Russian Empire forcibly removed its Circassian population from its lands, in probably the first large-scale state-sponsored ethnic cleansing in the modern era. The Russians referred to the Circassians as a ‘pestilence’ and ‘sub-filth’, much like how Armenians and Jews were described by those who perpetrated their attempted extermination. Known as the *Tsitsekun* by Circassians, a Russian general who led the operations, Nikolay Yevdakimov, referred to them as *ochishchenie* (cleansing the land). Much of these ‘operations’ were genocidal, yet the main objective was to expel the population to the Ottoman Empire.³² Variations on the term, such as ‘cleansing the terrain’, and ‘cleansing the borders’ were used by different eastern European groups in the 1930s and during World War II, but most interestingly by the Nazis themselves when describing the Holocaust, referring to Europe being ‘cleansed of Jews’ (*judenrein*). Here lies a different meaning since the Nazis did not mean ethnic cleansing, whereby the Jews would be forcibly relocated, but exterminated, in the same way that the Armenians were put onto death marches to be received by nobody so they would perish. Finally, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was only popularised during the Bosnian War (1992–95), when during the collapse of Yugoslavia mass violence saw various groups forced to move to areas where they could be protected from the ‘other’.³³

A legal definition emerged during this period. A ‘UN Commission of Experts’ looking into violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing in its interim report S/25274 as ‘... rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area’. Then in its final report S/1994/674, the same Commission described ethnic cleansing as ‘... a

³¹Layla Quran, ‘What’s the Difference Between Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing?’ *PBS Newshour* (24 October 2017).

³²Walter Richmond, *The Circassian Genocide* (Rutgers Uni Press 2013).

³³Gerard Toal and Carl T. Dahlman, *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal* (Oxford Uni Press 2011); Mary Fulbrook, *A Concise History of Germany* (Cambridge Uni Press 2004) 197; Terry Martin, ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’ (1998) 70(4) *Journal of Modern History* 813.

purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas'.³⁴ This legal definition reinforced the historical origins of the term, namely that it means to use mass, even genocidal, violence to cleanse a territory of a genus.

Considering the above, ethnic cleansing is distinguishable from genocide because the intent is to forcibly remove a genus from a territory, that is, the mass expulsion across an international border of members of a genus by another. This may include any of the genocidal processes previously outlined, including massacres and forced expulsion, but not an extermination policy, since that would defeat the aim to expel the group across the border to another territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this means that mass death is a part of ethnic cleansing, whether due to negligence, overzealousness, or lack of resources, since it can be used as a mechanism to forcibly move other members of the genus who are frightened that they too will be killed. Although ethnic cleansing generally refers to the forced movement of a genus to another country, forced movement of a genus within the same country does occur, and is generally referred to as internal displacement or geographical separation.

Now that the typologies genocide, genocidal acts, and ethnic cleansing have been defined, and their differences and similarities have been delineated, something identical about them should be highlighted, the fact that in both events the perpetrators dehumanise and denationalise (strip the nationality) the victims. Although I suggest that ethnic cleansing might be one step below genocide, the intent to implement ethnic cleansing can easily change during the course of the act into not merely something that is genocidal, but genocide itself.

Historical context

From the 1890s the Ottoman Empire experienced violent internal convulsions, in which the state turned on its Christian subjects, first because they demanded more rights, and then during the Great War because they were collectively blamed for the disastrous Ottoman war losses. This mass violence aimed at preserving the Muslim character of the Ottoman Empire and later the idea of a Turkey, especially Anatolia, for Muslims and Turks. It was not always like this and could not have been, for the Ottoman Empire had existed for many centuries. It did so because it had a system, the millet system, that separated society into religious groups and made religious elites responsible for the behaviour of their flock. Although Christian minorities were not equal to their Muslim neighbours, most peasant and working-class Christians had more in common with their Muslim fellow peasants and labourers than with those Christians who formed the elite and the growing middle class of traders and white-collar workers. This rather pre-modern system began to break down as the Ottoman 'Tanzimat' (Reorganisation) from the 1830s not only recentralized the administrative system, but created local councils with secular leaders from minority groups, allowing for the rise of nationalism. This

³⁴UN Security Council, Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, S/1994/674. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/582060704.html> accessed 1 February 2024.

ethnic, not civic, variant, grew amongst the Christian populations from the top down, as the middle class jostled with the religious elites for authority. Additionally, while Armenians may have hoped for a homeland of their own, through maintaining their position of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks had a small neighbouring kingdom to perhaps hope to join one day, though many preferred Ottoman safety and security. The formation of nation-states or the desired formation of nation-states formed one-half of the so-called Eastern Question, which existed from about the 1770s until the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The other aspect was the rivalry of the European Powers over their interests, real or imagined, formal or informal, within the Ottoman Empire and sphere, and their role in Ottoman affairs.³⁵

When the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in November 1914, the Ottoman Empire had been transformed into a constitutional monarchy. This change, however, had not created any lasting improved treatment or increased rights for Christian minorities, especially since the new constitutional monarchy had failed to punish the perpetrators of the 1909 Adana Armenian massacres, which had occurred as part of a counter-revolution to bring back Sultanic autocracy.³⁶ After a tussle for power between the anglophile Liberals and the pro-German Union and Progress, on the eve of the outbreak of the Great War the latter made its position on its Armenian minority clear by opposing the imposition by the European powers of reforms to the Ottoman Armenian provinces. Although a compromise was found, the changes were not fully implemented, while the Germans, the least supportive of the reforms, continued to influence the Ottoman armed forces and by extension the military triumvirate ruling the country. By August 1914 even the minimal reforms introduced began to be repealed.³⁷ It is no surprise, therefore, that the triumvirate entered the Ottoman Empire into the war in November 1914 on the side of the Central Powers.³⁸ It is also no surprise that when the war effort started badly, even against the hapless Russians, to preserve the government and prevent a revolution against it, it turned on its Armenian subjects.³⁹

³⁵Bedross Der Matossian, *Shattered Dreams of Revolution: From Liberty to Violence in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Stanford Uni Press 2014); Fatma Müge-Göçek and Murat Özyüksel, 'The Ottoman Empire's Negotiation of Western Liberal Imperialism' in Matthew Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Liberal Imperialism in Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 193–217; Andrekos Varnava, 'British and Greek Liberalism and Imperialism in the Long Nineteenth Century' in Matthew Fitzpatrick (ed.), *Liberal Imperialism in Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 219–40; Michelle Tusan, 'Britain and the Middle East: New Historical Perspectives on the Eastern Question' (2010) 8 (3) *History Compass* 212; Andrekos Varnava, *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878–1915: The Inconsequential Possession* (Manchester Uni Press 2009); M. Şükrü, Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (Oxford Uni Press 2001); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (I.B. Tauris 1998); Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Hurst 1995).

³⁶Bedross Der Matossian, *The Horrors of Adana: Revolution and Violence in the Early Twentieth Century* (Stanford Uni Press 2022); Bedross Der Matossian, 'From Bloodless Revolution to a Bloody Counter-revolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909' (2011) 6(2) *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 152.

³⁷Hans-Lukas Kieser, Mehmet Polatel and Thomas Schmutz, 'Reform or cataclysm? The agreement of 8 February 1914 regarding the Ottoman eastern provinces' (2015) 17(3) *Journal of Genocide Research* 285.

³⁸Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge Uni Press 2010); Frank G. Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914–1918* (Cornell Uni Press 1970); Ulrich Trumpener, 'Liman von Sanders and the German-Ottoman alliance' (1966) 1(4) *Journal of Contemporary History* 179; Ulrich Trumpener, 'Turkey's Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities' (1962) 34(4) *Journal of Modern History* 369.

³⁹Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Talaat Pasha: Father of Modern Turkey, Architect of Genocide* (Princeton Uni Press 2018).

Population dynamics and importance

Before exploring our cases, the population statistics of the victim groups must be understood since it is pivotal in distinguishing between genocide and ethnic cleansing. The estimated number of people who perish as a result of the destructive genocidal processes is important to compare to the original population before the event, as well as with the number surviving. This would contribute to discussions over intent and the implementation of the genocidal processes. Similarly, for ethnic cleansing the numbers of killed compared to the numbers who survive is vital in understanding the extent of the genocidal processes being implemented as well as showing that it was the intent to forcibly relocate and thus internally displace or ethnically cleanse (externally displace) rather than exterminate that lay behind these processes.

The demographic question is more problematic in the Ottoman context than probably any other place because of the unreliability and disputed nature of the figures presented by various groups. It is not the aim here to explore these, but to provide reliable figures based on sound methodology.⁴⁰ In 1914 British intelligence prepared a map of the populations of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire bordering the Ottoman based on the study of official and unofficial records.⁴¹ I am not saying that these figures are accurate, but since they fall within the ranges of those presented by almost all other sources, these must be relatively accurate. The Armenian population was estimated to be around 3M and since it is generally accepted that there were about 900 K in the Russian Empire bordering the Ottoman (excluding Moscow and other Russian cities), then there were about 2.1M in the Ottoman Empire. The total Greek population is given as 2.3M, and since it is known that in 1914 there were about 500 K Greeks living in Russia bordering the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Greeks numbered about 1.8M.⁴²

Our cases explored

The cases being explored are: Armenian Genocide, 1915–16; Ottoman ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Greeks, 1916–18; Turkish ethnic cleansing of Anatolian Greeks, 1919–22; and Turkish ethnic cleansing of Armenians, 1919–22. Two cases were under the Ottoman government and two were under the Turkish Nationalists, although the official government was the Ottoman one. It is important to recognise the continuities between the Ottoman wartime government of the CUP and the Kemalist Nationalists, with Kemal himself being a member of the CUP and he accepting many former CUP members, including some who had implemented the Armenian Genocide.⁴³ The main difference was that the key wartime leaders were gone and Kemal was the leader, and as Taner Akçam showed, Kemal believed that the Armenian Genocide was ‘a shameful act’⁴⁴ – though as I believe only next

⁴⁰For a fulsome debate, see Sjöberg (n 8) 45–8.

⁴¹FO925/41255, Demographic map of Ottoman and Russian empires, British intelligence, 1914.

⁴²In addition to the map in FO925/41255, see: Antonis Klapsis, ‘Violent Uprooting and Forced Migration: A Demographic Analysis of the Greek Populations of Asia Minor, Pontus and Eastern Thrace’ (2014) 50(4) *Middle Eastern Studies* 622; Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (I.B. Tauris 2011) 265–78; Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison Uni Press 1985); Kemal H. Karpat, ‘Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–1893’ (1978) 9(2) *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 237.

⁴³Ugur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford Uni Press 2011).

level to what occurred under his leadership. The cases will be explored below first in terms of their characteristics, then they will be compared and contrasted, and finally the numbers that perished and survived will be examined to show how the actions against the victims matched with the intent, thus allowing for us to conclude on whether it was genocide or ethnic cleansing.

So much has been published on the Armenian Genocide that it hardly seems possible to add anything new. But given that there are some scholars that accept the Turkish denial, it is important to present the facts, and perhaps give them a different presentation and analysis. Firstly, it is important to make clear that the Ottoman government issued written orders to exterminate its Armenian community, thus evidencing its intent to commit a genocide.⁴⁵ The best way to understand how the Ottoman government systematically implemented the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and 1916 is to examine the processes of extermination and destruction of the community. Based on my reading of many varied sources⁴⁶ there were broadly five processes of extermination and destruction, including cultural destruction, of the community:

- (1) Murder of civil servants, military personnel and elites (political, religious, financial, and intellectual), at the end of 1914 and start of 1915, culminating in the infamous arrests and murders on 24 April 1915.
- (2) Mass murder mostly as a result of the 'deportation', more accurately the enforced death marches, of the entire general Armenian population, that is, women, children and elderly, beginning soon after 24 April 1915. The intent and specific orders was to mass murder all of the Ottoman Armenians under the government established 'special organisation' or by enforced starvation on the way or at their final destination, the desert of Deir ez-Zor. The so-called 'deportations' were a cloak for extermination. This was legalised with the 'Temporary Law of Deportation' passed on 29 May 1915 during the height of the Genocide, which had already started over a month earlier.
- (3) Forced assimilation of teenage girls and children, which aimed to destroy Armenian society, culture and identity. During the death marches teenage girls and children were kidnapped and given to Turkish families to raise as their own, thus changing their culture and religion, from Armenian and Christian, to Turkish and Muslim.
- (4) Expropriation of Armenian properties and goods, which was legalised through 'Temporary Law of Expropriation and Confiscation' passed September 1915. This allowed the Ottoman government to seize all 'abandoned' Armenian goods and properties and distribute them to Turkish Muslim families, which they mostly did to those who had been displaced during the recent Balkan Wars. This again showed

⁴⁴Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (Henry Holt 2007). It is beyond the scope of this essay, but it should be acknowledged that it is disputed that Kemal said of the Armenian Genocide that it was 'a shameful act'. If he did say it, it was in an interview for international and not domestic listeners. See Philip M. Pedley, *The Ataturk Interview: Armenian Tall Tales or an Inconvenient Truth?* (Gomidas Institute 2018).

⁴⁵Taner Akçam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* (Palgrave 2018).

⁴⁶Michelle Tusan, "'Crimes against Humanity': Human Rights, the British Empire, and the Origins of the Response to the Armenian Genocide" (2014) 119(1) *The American Historical Review* 47; Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide*; Ayhan Aktar, 'Debating the Armenian Massacres in the Last Ottoman Parliament, November-December 1918' (2007) 64(1) *History Workshop Journal* 240; Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford Uni Press 2005); Talk by Uğur Ümit Üngör (30 April 2012): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dymso_Wr5RM&t=14s.

that the 'deportations', ostensibly as a war measure', were a cloak for extermination since it was not intended for the Armenians to return to their homes and take possession of their goods, since the intent was for them to perish.

(5) Destruction of material culture, particularly of religious buildings.

These genocidal processes, which match the legal definition of genocide and most definitions, together constitute an official premeditated and organised attempt at a genocide of the Armenian people. It should go without saying that the Ottoman and subsequent Turkish government positions, that the Ottoman government aimed at relocating the Armenians for their own safety because of the war, or because they had colluded with the enemy, namely the Russians, does not hold up under scrutiny and implies a collective punishment for those few that joined the Russian forces, and who in reality probably made little impact on the war front.⁴⁷

The above processes did not all occur, did not occur officially or systematically in the three other cases, certainly not with the intent to exterminate those populations, namely the Ottoman relocation and internal displacement of Ottoman Greeks from 1916 to 1918 and the Nationalist Turkish ethnic cleansing of Anatolian Greeks and Armenians from 1919 to 1923. This is obvious from the fact that the majority of the Armenian population from 1915 to 1916 perished during the Genocide, while in the other cases most of the populations survived, either moved internally or fled or were expelled to other countries to deal with.

From 1916 to 1918 the Ottoman government implemented a policy to relocate and internally displace Anatolian Greeks from their proximity to war zones or potential war zones. It resulted in many Greeks perishing as a result of opportunistic, indiscriminate and negligent actions of the Ottoman government and its regional authorities. Attacks against Ottoman Greeks was officially discouraged by the Ottoman government to ensure Greece's neutrality, but Ottoman Greeks were caught up in the Armenian Genocide and arbitrary, opportunistic, violence. After Venizelos established a pro-Entente government in Salonica in 1916 and the British and French established the Macedonian Front, the attacks recommenced and the interest of the Ottoman state to stop them waned. In January 1917 Talaat Pasha ordered the removal of Greeks living in Samsun (near the Russian front) inland about 40 km and that no harm should come to them, yet many died from ill-treatment and neglect. In March 1917 around 30 K Greeks in Ayvalık, a town on the Aegean just north of Smyrna/Izmir, were relocated to the interior of Anatolia, but many died from beatings, starvation and in massacres. Such orders were broadened to other coastal regions after June 1917, especially in the Pontus. These orders were not implemented properly and there were not enough provisions to allocate to these displaced people given the wider war, and many perished in isolated massacres and during their forced movement. Additionally, orders to 'clear' Pontus may have been misinterpreted by overzealous local authorities as well as by historians. In total during these

⁴⁷George N. Shirinian, 'Starvation and Its Political Use in the Armenian Genocide' (2017) 11(1) *Genocide Studies International* 8; Ümit Kurt, 'Cultural Erasure: The Absorption and Forced Conversion of Armenian Women and Children, 1915–1916' (2016) 7 *Études arméniennes contemporaines* online: <https://doi.org/10.4000/eac.997>; Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws: The Plunder of Wealth in the Armenian Genocide* (Berghahn 2015); Lerna Ekmekcioglu, 'A Climate for Abduction, a Climate for Redemption: The Politics of Inclusion during and after the Armenian Genocide' (2013) 55(3) *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 522; Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property* (Continuum 2011).

war years, it is estimated that from 80,000 to 200,000 may have perished as a result of these 'relocation' policies, probably at the lower scale of this range.⁴⁸

After the armistice, the Turkish Nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal emerged to challenge the Ottoman regime in Istanbul and the plans of the victorious powers for the Ottoman Empire, especially the territorial losses it was planning for it in Anatolia.⁴⁹ As part of what the Turks refer to as their 'War of Independence', two separate yet interconnected conflicts occurred, one against the Armenians and their French supporters in the south-eastern provinces, and another against the Greek Orthodox population, after Greece landed forces and occupied Smyrna/Izmir and its environs. Both of these conflicts were archetypical cases of ethnic cleansing because the intent was to expel the Armenians and Greeks from what the Turks considered were Muslim lands, however, both also saw atrocities occur, including massacres, which were used as a tool to facilitate the ethnic cleansing.⁵⁰

Around 300 K Armenians who survived the Genocide or had been abroad at the time returned to the south-eastern provinces of Anatolia from 1919 under French protection, as the territory was to become a French mandate. This included the Armenians in the *Legion d'Orient*, who were to act as an Armenian army, and alongside the French forces would comprise the armed forces of the future French mandate of Cilicia. Despite the best efforts of the French, members of the *Legion d'Orient* did embark upon reprisals for the genocide, which galvanised Muslims to follow Kemal's call for a nationalist movement. In February 1920, Turkish Nationalist forces attacked French forces in Marash and quickly gained the upper hand, as the French lacked both manpower and resources after the British had withdrawn. The French soon capitulated and signed a peace treaty with the Kemalists on 9 March and another in October sealed their withdrawal to Syria, and the Armenians fled. In all around 100 K Armenians, mostly men, were killed and another 200 K fled to neighbouring countries, such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq and Cyprus, and further afield to France and the US.⁵¹

It is pivotal to provide some relative accuracy as regards the number of Armenians killed between 1915 and 1923. This will show clearly that what happened in 1915 and 1916 was a genocide, while what happened between 1919 and 1923 contained genocidal acts, but was ethnic cleansing. As discussed above, the Ottoman Armenian population can be reliably estimated in 1914 to be about 2.1M. Historians estimate the Armenian deaths in 1915 and 1916 from 800 K to 1.4M. 1.15M seems a reliable estimate given how many died between 1919 and 1923 and how many ultimately survived. From

⁴⁸Hans Lukas Keiser, *When Democracy Died: The Middle East's Enduring Peace of Lausanne* (Cambridge Uni Press 2023) 61 & 69; Doumanis, *Before the Nation*; Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire* (Princeton Uni Press 2012) 105–19; Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide* (Zed Books 2004) 146.

⁴⁹See Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918* (Cambridge Uni Press 2011); David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (Macmillan 2009).

⁵⁰See also Mark H. Ward, *The Deportations in Asia Minor 1921–1922* (Anglo-Hellenic League 1922).

⁵¹Andrekos Varnava, 'Society and Identity in the former Ottoman World: Encounters between Cypriots and Armenians of the *Légion d'Orient* in Cyprus in 1917–18' in Michael J.K. Walsh and Andrekos Varnava (eds), *After the Armistice: Empire, Endgame and Aftermath* (Routledge 2021) 74–94; Susan Paul Pattie, *The Armenian Legionnaires: Sacrifice and Betrayal in World War I* (I.B. Tauris 2018); Andrekos Varnava, 'Famagusta during the Great War: From Backwater to Bustling', in Michael Walsh (ed), *Famagusta: City of Empires, 1571–1960* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2015) 91–111; Varnava, 'French and British Post-War Imperial Agendas and Forging an Armenian Homeland after the Genocide'; Robert F. Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918–1922* (TTK 2005).

1919 to 1923 the Armenian deaths have been estimated at 100 K. This makes for a total death toll of 1.25M for 1915–23. This seems a reliable estimate given that there were 850 K Ottoman Armenian survivors after 1923, 290 K in Russia, 280 K in what became Turkey, 200 K in the Middle East, 70 K in Western Europe, mainly France, and 10 K going to the US. 1.25M dead added to 850 K survivors, equals the estimated population in 1914 of 2.1M.⁵² The two main points that evidence a genocide for 1915 and 1916 and not 1919–23 is that the estimated deaths of 1.15M out of the estimated 2.1M population constitutes 55 per cent of the population. This percentage approximates the percentage of Jews that perished during the Holocaust, which is 63 per cent (6M from a population of 9.5M), over a longer period and at the hands of a thoroughly modernised German war machine (at least from late 1941 when gas was first used), compared to the Ottomans, who employed more crude and less technologically advanced methods for the duration of the Genocide.

The defeat of the French and the Armenians allowed the Turkish Nationalists to then pursue the Greeks in the West. The catalyst was the landing of Greek forces in Smyrna/Izmir in May 1919. British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, who had produced a report on the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and 1916, witnessed and reported upon Greek massacres against Turks, which were confirmed by the Inter-Allied commission (British, French, American and Italian officers).⁵³ After the Treaty of Sevres was proposed in August 1920, Greek forces headed for Ankara (after King Constantine had returned to the throne), continuing to commit atrocities while in retreat. But they were soon halted and pushed back, meanwhile continuing to commit atrocities. The Turkish nationalists reciprocated with their own atrocities against the Greek forces and Anatolian Greek communities, especially after the war with the French and the Armenians had concluded with the expulsion of the Armenians.⁵⁴ The aim of the Turkish Nationalists was to cleanse Anatolia of non-Muslims. In the Pontus region, bordering the Black Sea, Greeks were moved to the Anatolian interior so any force that might land on the coast could not link up with these Greek communities. Many perished during these marches because of a lack of provisions and because those implementing the relocation were disinterested in keeping them alive, with some having perpetrated the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and 1916, even though the Turkish Nationalist leadership wanted to exchange them for Muslims in Greece.⁵⁵ The most infamous atrocity was the burning of Smyrna/Izmir. On 9 September 1922 Turkish Nationalist forces captured Smyrna/Izmir and four days later the city was on fire, lasting until 22 September. The fire destroyed the Greek and Armenian quarters, but not the Muslim and Jewish quarters. It has been estimated that 10,000–50,000 people perished (probably about 30,000), mainly Greeks and Armenians, and 200,000 fled on ships.⁵⁶ The proportion of those that perished to those that survived

⁵²Varnava, *British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914–1925* 135–44; Talin Suciyan, *The Armenians in Modern Turkey: Post-Genocide Society, Politics and History* (I.B. Tauris 2015); Klapsis, 'Violent Uprooting and Forced Migration'; Raymond Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History* (I.B. Tauris 2011) 265–78; Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, (Berghahn 2003); Karpát, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*; Karpát, 'Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82–1893'.

⁵³Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (Houghton Mifflin 1922). The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjoining Territories, 1919: <http://www.ataa.org/reference/iacom.pdf> See also Peter M. Buzanski, 'The Interallied Investigation of the Greek Invasion of Smyrna, 1919' (1963) 25(3) *The Historian* 325.

⁵⁴Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922* (St. Martin's Press 1973).

⁵⁵Sjöberg (n 8).

this catastrophic event again indicates that the primary intent was to expel the Greeks and Armenians, and not to exterminate them, and that killing them was one strategy to achieve ethnic cleansing.

Providing a reliable estimate of the Anatolian Greeks killed from 1915 to 1922 will evidence that the primary intent was to relocate, through internal displacement from 1916 to 1918, and then ethnically cleanse Anatolia from 1919 to 1922. During both periods there were genocidal acts, including massacres, especially the second time. The fleeing Greeks and exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in 1923 saw 1.1M Greeks settle in Greece from Turkey, with another 60 K settling in the Soviet Union, the US, France, Egypt and Cyprus. Also, in 1924 there were still 340 K Greeks living in Turkey, although this number would reduce by the census of 1927, this total are survivors. Thus, in total 1.5M Anatolian Greeks survived out of an estimated population in 1914 of 1.8M. It is estimated that from 1916 to 1918 from 80K to 200 K Anatolian Greeks died, probably closer to 100 K. For the period from 1919 to 1922 it is estimated that from 100K to 600 K had died (although some claim over 1M), but probably 200 K. Often 353 K is given for Pontian deaths alone. Sjöberg showed how the number of 353 K was arrived at in 1925 by Valavanis without any verification and after adding the random figure of 50 K to a total of 303 K he found in a propaganda pamphlet that presented no evidence in support of the figure. Tellingly, Tasos Kostopoulos, a Greek investigative journalist, rejected that figure and estimated that between 100 and 150 K were killed in Pontos for the period 1912–23. Doumanis agreed.⁵⁷ If the range for the total number of Anatolian Greeks killed from 1916 to 1923 ranges from 230K to 800 K, the higher range must be ruled out given the agreement between these eminent historians and given the number of Anatolian Greeks that survived when matched to the estimated population in 1914. Reliably, total deaths for the period from 1916 to 1923 were around 300 K (100 K for 1916–18 and 200 K for 1919–23), which aligns with the number of survivors and the population in 1914 (1.5M survivors plus 300 K dead, equals 1.8M population in 1914). This means that 16.7 per cent perished, which is a substantial percentage of the 1914 population, yet nowhere near that of the Armenians, or indeed of the Jews during the Holocaust. This indicates that although massacres and mass deaths occurred, the primary intent was either relocation (during the Great War) or ethnic cleansing (1919–23).⁵⁸

Conclusion

This essay has argued that definitions are important and need to be accurate when exploring genocidal processes and genocide itself. Politics, ethnic affiliations and other baggage, including emotional attachments, should be left out in attributing the labels of genocide and ethnic cleansing, which is an example or a cause of mass deportation.

⁵⁶See the following: Michelle Tusan, *Smyrna's Ashes: Humanitarianism, Genocide, and the Birth of the Middle East* (Uni of California Press 2012); Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City* (Newmark Press 1998); Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision*.

⁵⁷Sjöberg (n 8) 46–47 & 223–37; Doumanis, *Before the Nation* 35.

⁵⁸Klapisis, 'Violent Uprooting and Forced Migration'; Onur Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922–1934* (Routledge 2013); Kévorkian, *The Armenian Genocide* 265–78; Renée Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: an Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (Berghahn Books 2003); George Kritikos, 'State Policy and Urban Employment of Refugees: The Greek Case (1923–30)' (2000) 7(2) *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire* 189; Karpát, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914*.

It has been argued that the Ottoman government perpetuated a genocide of its Armenian population in 1915 and 1916, but other atrocities committed by it during the Great War against its Anatolian Greek community and those done by the Turkish nationalists after the Great War against both Armenians and Greeks were not genocide, though they were genocidal, with the aim being internal displacement of the Greeks during the Great War and external displacement, or ethnic cleansing, after. This also means that the ethnic cleansing of the Armenians that followed the earlier Genocide was a distinct phase, and that it was possible to revert to ethnic cleansing after having embarked upon a Genocide (which is the reverse of these processes in the Holocaust).

What the Ottoman regime did to the Armenians in 1915 and 1916 was a Genocide because there was clear:

- Intent to exterminate the Armenian population, with orders to do so given;
- Genocidal processes as official policy (i.e. in this case orders communicated to state officials by the centre) implemented by the government and was well organised;
- Demographic changes caused by deaths that evidences intent and practices to exterminate population;

What the Ottoman and Turkish Nationalist forces did to the Anatolian Greeks (1916–23) and Armenians (1919–23) was ethnic relocation, which caused displacement, (during the War) and ethnic cleansing after the War, because.

- There was no intent to exterminate these populations, with the aim being to internally displace the Greeks during the War and after the War to ethnically cleanse Anatolia of both Armenians and Greeks;
- Mass killings and some other genocidal processes were featured, but they were not systematic or official policy to be applied to all for the purposes of extermination (either from a central authority or local regional authorities), but inspired by opportunity or revenge, or as a tool in order to expediate the policy of ethnic relocation and cleansing;
- The numbers killed and those that survived is evidence that the intent was displacement and ethnic cleansing, rather than extermination, and does not approximate the percentage that perished in the Armenian Genocide or the Holocaust, which are comparable and evidences an intent to exterminate in those examples.

These conclusions in no way invalidate the suffering and loss of any of the communities impacted by these devastating actions. Whether it classifies as genocide, as in the Armenian case for 1915 and 1916, or internal ethnic displacement or ethnic cleansing, intermixed with genocidal acts, it is still a crime against humanity. That is a key point. But if the academy is to have any relevance in public life, definitions and accurate historical knowledge based on sound methodological reconstructions and critical reflections must hold sway over personal, emotional, ethnic and political considerations. This article is important now because governments, lobbyists and non-government organisations are very active in this space. They are meant to support victim groups and should choose accuracy of terminology over labels that might appear more catastrophic in painting certain events, so they can be credible advocates.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Andrekos Varnava, FRHistS, FRSA, is Professor in British Imperial and Colonial Histories at Flinders University, South Australia and an Honorary Professor in History at De Montfort University, Leicester. He has authored four monographs: *Assassination in Colonial Cyprus in 1934 and the Origins of EOKA* (Anthem Press, 2021); *British Cyprus and the Long Great War, 1914–25: Empire, Loyalties and Democratic Deficit* (Routledge, 2020); *Serving the Empire in the Great War: The Cypriot Mule Corps, Imperial Loyalty and Silenced Memory* (Manchester University Press, 2017); and *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878–1915: The Inconsequential Possession* (Manchester University Press, 2009). He has edited/co-edited 16 collections, most recently: *Popular Culture and its Relationship to Conflict in the UK and Australia since the Great War* (Routledge, 2023); *New Perspectives on the Greek War of Independence: Myths, Realities, Legacies and Reflections* (Palgrave, 2022); and *Exiting War: The British Empire and the 1918–20 Moment* (Manchester University Press, 2022). He has published over 65 articles/chapters, including in *English Historical Review* (2017), *The Historical Journal* (2014), *Journal of Modern History* (2018), *Historical Research* (2014, 2017, 2022), *Contemporary British History* (2019), *Social History of Medicine* (2020), *International History Review* (2021), *Immigrants & Minorities* (2022), *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (2023), *Labor History* (2023), *Australian Historical Studies* (2024) and *European Review of History* (2024).

ORCID

Andrekos Varnava  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6105-9346>